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ABSTRACT

The 1981 issue of the "History of Higher Education Annual," which is the first issue, is presented. The first of six articles, "A Message to Lushtamar: The Hilprecht Controversy and Semitic Scholarship in America," by Paul Ritterband and Harold Wechsler describes the impact of disagreement among scholars on the development of semitic scholarship. In "Church, State, and Higher Education: College Government in the American Colonies and States before 1820," Jurgen Herbst surveys the development of American college government prior to 1820 and considers the types of institutions that developed: state universities, private colleges sponsored by religious groups, private colleges sponsored by other private groups, and the degree-granting proprietary professional school. In "Education in Conflict: The Booker Washington Institute of Liberia," Donald Spivey examines the controversy surrounding this Institute in Liberia in the years following its founding in 1929; David B. Potts, in "Curriculum and Enrollments: Some Thoughts on Assessing the Popularity of Antebellum Colleges," uses enrollment data to reassess the popularity of colleges in antebellum America. In "The Bryn Mawr Workers' Summer School, 1921, 1933: A Surprising Alliance," Rita R. Heller comments on the early twentieth century Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers from a feminist perspective. Finally, in "The University Under Mussolini: The Fascist-Catholic Struggle for Italian Youth, 1922-1943," Richard J. Wolff describes the struggle between Fascists and Catholics under Mussolini for the allegiance of Italian college students. (SW)

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INTRODUCTION TO FIRST ISSUE

We are pleased to have this opportunity to present to those with a professional interest in the history of higher education the History of Higher Education Annual. Our purpose is to provide opportunity for the dissemination of ideas and exchange of information and to establish a forum for scholarly work both by colleagues who are established in the field and by those who are embarking upon a scholarly career. The pages of the Annual are open to all who have an interest in this area of history, not only as it relates to the United States but internationally.

Our first issue reflects this eclecticism. It includes a paper by Jurgen Herbst surveying the development of American college government prior to 1820 and another by David B. Potts using enrollment data to reassess the popularity of colleges in antebellum America. Rita R. Heller comments on the early twentieth century Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers from a feminist perspective, while Paul Ritterband and Harold Wechsler describe the impact of disagreement among scholars on the development of semitic scholarship in America. Two papers discuss the history of higher education abroad. Donald Spivey examines the controversy surrounding the Booker Washington Institute of Liberia in the years following its founding in 1929. Richard J. Wolff describes the struggle between Fascists and Catholics under Mussolini for the allegiance of Italian college students.

We wish to point out that this is a refereed journal, a responsibility assumed most cordially by the members of our editorial board and others who are established historians with a knowledge of colleges and universities. To the members of the editorial board, we acknowledge a debt not only for their support essential to initiating an enterprise such as this, but for their active and cordial involvement. Professors Joan Burstyn of Rutgers University and David Jones of the University of Hartford have shared with us the final editing of manuscripts for the issue.

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A Message to Lushtamar: The Hilprecht Controversy and Semitic Scholarship in America

Paul Ritterband
Harold Wechsler

About four thousand years ago, a Babylonian wrote a letter to a contemporary named Lushtamar, inserted it into a clay envelope, and baked it as a method of sealing. Lushtamar never opened the epistle. Neither did Herman Hilprecht, Professor of Assyriology at the University of Pennsylvania, into whose hands the tablet fell at the turn of the twentieth century. On page 532 of his account of the four Babylonian archaeological expeditions undertaken by the University between 1889 and 1900, Hilprecht described the tablet in some detail and seemingly placed its discovery in the long-sought Temple Library at Nippur, in present day Iraq.(1) Hilprecht did not anticipate the uproar the apparent attribution would create among American and foreign Semiticists, university officials and even among members of Philadelphia society. In order to understand the debate's intensity and protractedness and, more generally, the Hilprecht controversy's place in the history of American higher education, we must begin with a survey of Semitics' status in American universities in the late nineteenth century.

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As nearly all writing on Semitics in American higher education took pains to point out, Hebrew had composed a significant proportion of the curriculum of several colonial colleges. But while some early presidents considered themselves Hebraists, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, student indifference and diminished Puritanical fervor resulted in that subject's subsequent neglect. Sporadic efforts at rekindling interest failed. When Hebrew finally reentered the curriculum at century's end, it came as a member of a language family. Since its vocabulary and structure were relatively well understood, it did not stand on the cutting edge of Semitic scholarship. Hebrew still served as the language of field entry, but once aboard most scholars concentrated upon those tongues, such as Assyrian (now Akkadian), whose decipherment would unlock information about hitherto unknown civilizations. Several institutions, including Cornell and Johns Hopkins, established Semitics chairs in the 1870s, but more permanent arrangements awaited the following decade. In the early 1880s, Harvard appointed Crawford Toy and David Gordon Lyon, both Semitic philologists, the latter being the former's students, to professorships. Johns Hopkins imported Paul Haupt, a young German Semiticist, to a professorship in 1883. Three years later, Columbia, the University of Pennsylvania and Yale entered the field. In 1892, the University of Chicago opened with Yale's former Semitics professor William Rainey Harper at the helm. Finally, in 1894 the University of California began work in Semitics. These departments were the most prominent of the sixteen or more created in the late nineteenth century.

Perhaps presidential interest constituted the single most important cause of the field's renewal. Johns Hopkins' Daniel Coit Gilman believed that research in Semitic languages would significantly aid in the reconciliation of science and religion by clarifying sacred texts. He served for a number of years as President of the American Oriental Society. William R. Harper's interest stemmed from the challenge of devising a method of teaching Hebrew and from his involvement in the controversy surrounding the higher criticism as an approach to understanding the Bible. Considered by his colleagues to be the field's most influential spokesman, Harper served as chairman of the Chicago Semitics department (whose roster contained more faculty than any other American department) during his presidential tenure. Harvard President Charles W. Eliot's militant Unitarianism, his philo-Semitism, and his desire to build up Harvard as America's premier university account for much of his interest. Harvard's department, along with Columbia's, California's and others, received considerable financial and moral support from local Jewish communities, and at last a dozen early Semitics instructors were themselves Jewish. At Harvard, Jacob Schiff's benefactions helped endow both faculty salaries and a well-appointed Semitics Museum. Eliot demonstrated his concern for Jews in other settings, notably in the controversy over restriction of Jews to Harvard College in 1922. His interest in Semitics continued after his retirement in 1909. Subsequently, he assumed the chairmanship of the Visiting Committee to the Semitics Museum.

In the context of our story, Eliot's institutional concerns are of greatest importance. William Rosenau, in an early survey of Semitic studies in American

colleges, explicitly stated what most practitioners considered the desirable norm. "An institution to be worthy of the title 'University,'" he wrote, "should have a chair in Semitics." European scholars universally recognized that subject's importance; indeed, "A European university would as little think of being without a chair in Greek and Latin classics." Reflecting the sentiment shared by many scholars recently returned from advanced study in the German universities, Rosenau argued that American curricular practice ought to emulate Europe's. "The University which does not look to the establishment of a Semitic professorship falls behind in the race for perfection, recognition and influence."(2) Thus, Eliot, decided to appoint a Semitic philologist when a student offered a thesis on an Arabic subject and, lacking a competent faculty member to read it, had to send it to a Yale professor.(3) Eliot understood that Harvard would never become a world-class institution if it had to rely on competitive institutions in esoteric areas.

Similarly, university aspirations prompted University of Pennsylvania Provost (the title accorded that institution's chief executive officer) William Pepper took favorably upon creation of a Semitics program. John Peters, that institution's Professor of Hebrew, and a trainee of German Semitic seminaries, recalled Pepper's enthusiasm for a suggestion that the University sponsor an archaeological expedition to the Near East. Such a venture "would be made to appeal mightily to men's imaginations," and could serve as leverage for further growth. A museum could be erected to house the treasures unearthed, the library could be augmented, and so on. "He would reach out into this field and that, and build a real University on great

lines," Peters wrote. "It was the vision of a prophet alike in breadth and scope and fervor."(4)

By this time, Pennsylvania retained three professors, all trained in Europe. Peters held professorship in Hebrew at the Episcopal Theological Seminary in Philadelphia before assuming his Pennsylvania post in 1885. Herman Volrath Hilprecht graduated from the Bernberg Gymnasium in 1880, received his Ph.D. from Leipzig in 1885, and served as repetent tutor of Old Testament theology at Erlangen for a year before migrating to Philadelphia to accept the position of oriental editor of the **Sunday School Times**. Morris Jastrow, son of a prominent Philadelphia rabbi, studied at the Jewish Theological seminary at Breslau and at various German and French universities and received his Ph.D. from Leipzig in 1884.

At first, it appeared that the University, given its utilitarian emphasis and its scarce resources, would fail to accomodate all three. This probably heightened a sense of competition between the scholars. The trustees in 1886 elected Hilprecht to a lectureship in Egyptology for a year's tenure and Jastrow to a similar post in Arabic and Assyrian.(5) When shortly thereafter Hilprecht gained the inside track on a contemplated professorship of Assyrian, Jastrow initially wavered between entering the lists ("for my standing") or resigning his lectureship.(6) After some negotiation, Jastrow presented his candidacy for the Assyrian chair, but suggested that, should the mantle fall on another's shoulders, the trustees contemplated the creation of another chair in Arabic and Rabbinical Literature, "branches no less worthy of finding a place at an institution which has lately made such decided

advance towards the ideal of a University."(7) The trustees, recognizing that neither Hilprecht nor Jastrow requested compensation, created both chairs.(8)

In general, Semitics entered American universities during the 1880s as a more or less ornamental field and one fraught with competition. American Semitists intended to compete with their European colleagues for scholarly superiority. With a well thought out curriculum, wrote Rosenau, "the American college cannot help but be a fit rival, if not the superior, of the European university in Semitic studies."(9) Within American higher education, intense competition existed between institutions. When the University of Pennsylvania in 1888 attempted to secure a firman or permit from the Turkish government for its contemplated excavations in Babylonia, Johns Hopkins President Daniel C. Gilman registered an official protest with the American State Department. Hopkins Professor Paul Haupt desired to lead a similar expedition, and all knew that at best the turks were likely to grant only one firman. The prize went to Pennsylvania. A few years later, Johns Hopkins and Pennsylvania joined forces in an attempt to wrest control of the American Oriental Society from Harvard and Yale. Institutional chauvanism and ad hominem evaluations of rival scholars abounded. "...I do think that we men at Chicago should stick together for Chicago," wrote Assyriologist Robert Harper (William R. Harper's brother) after learning that two Chicago colleagues had been approached to edit volumes in a text series he considered competitive. "We have our own work, and we can organize more...This year has made me more loyal to Chicago than ever."(10) He reported to his brother that Paul Haupt had called him "no scholar" and claimed to have him "under his

thumb." Robert replied in kind, [Haupt] is a disgrace and people should know it. He has talked a good deal about you, but to no effect, as he is not taken seriously here [among Semitics scholars at the British Museum]."(11)

Finally rivalry existed at some institutions where the Semitics work was divided among several individuals. At Chicago, Robert Harper's relationship with James Breasted bore the stamp of jealousy from the outset, while his insistence that "the field [of Assyriology at Chicago] is mine," reflects personal insecurity as much as it did an ordinarius privileges.(12)

The rivalry at Pennsylvania between Jastrow and Hilprecht became increasingly intense and in time grew to involve not only their American colleagues but many European Semiticists as well. By the time the public controversy emerging from that rivalry ended in 1911, it helped transform interinstitutional as well as international relationships. The initial skirmishes took places over relatively small issues, such as where unique copies of Assyriological reference books owned by the University should be located.(13) Jastrow and Hilprecht contested for the right to offer courses in the various Semitic languages. At one point, Jastrow obtained a change in his chair's title to "Professor of Semitic Languages" with the proviso "that he [Jastrow] announce no courses in Assyrian or Ethiopic unless at the personal request of the Professor of Assyrian."(14) The University kept the scholars at arm's length by giving Jastrow additional duties (and salary) in the university library while providing Hilprecht with a curatorship in the university museum. Jastrow, who

maintained friendly relations with Peters, briefly assumed an assistant museum curatorship during an absense of Hilprecht in Europe. He used the opportunity to contest his colleague for the curatorship of the Babylonian section in 1892. A recommendation that both men be retained as curators came to naught, and Hilprecht continued as sole curator until his resignation almost two decades later.(15)

However acrimonious these skirmishes, the real bloodletting was reserved for the results of the Babylonian expedition. John Peters had called for such a venture upon his return from European study. "England and France have done noble work of exploration in Assyria and Babylonia," he told those Semiticists attendng the 1884 American Oriental Society meetings. "It is time for America to do her part. Let us send out an American expedition."(16) Scholarly preeminence in Semitics, Peters understood, required not merely the translation of extant texts, but the unearthing, cataloguing, translation, and publication of hitherto unknown antiquities. Peters secured funding for a reconnaisance expedition in 1883 from philanthropist Catherine Lorrilard Wolfe, but failed to secure additional backing until 1887 when he convinced a prominent Philadelphia banker, E. W. Clark, to head a subscription fund. By the fall of that year, Clark and Peters raised sufficient funds and the University of Pennsylvania agreed to sponsor the expedition.

After resolution of the difficulties attendant upon obtaining the necessary firman, Peters personally led the first two of the four expeditions to Nuffar, the modern name for the ancient city of Nippur. In 1893, however, he resigned his University post in order

to accept the rectorship of St. Michael's Church in New York City, a pulpit previously occupied by his grandfather and father. Hilprecht subsequently became the Babylonian expedition's scientific director while John Henry Haynes, who had served in several official capacities in the area, became field director of the third (1895-1897) and fourth (1899-1900) expeditions. Jastrow played no role in either. The fourth expedition culminated in the discovery of the largest cache of antiquities. Upon learning of Haynes' find, Hilprecht rushed to the scene and declared the discovery of the Temple Library of Nippur, containing lexicographical and linguistic items including "astronomical, mathematical and religious texts (hymms, prayers, etc.), letters, Temple accounts in large numbers (grosse Menge), whereby the character of a Temple Library is fixed and assured."(17) The ensuing controversy revolved around that claim's validity.

Hilprecht's publication of **Explorations in Bible Lands** in 1903 exposed the public to the internecine conflicts prevalent within the University for nearly two decades. The book's account of the Pennsylvania expedition severely criticized Peters' leadership of the first two ventures. Hilprecht claimed to have confined such criticism to "fundamental differences with regard to important technical and scientific questions."(18) Later, the press quoted Hilprecht as claiming that Peters' questions about the authenticity of the Library's discovery arose cut of jealousy and spite.(19) Hilprecht himself would write, "My mind always persists in seeking the real cause of the Doctor's animosity in those chapters of that fateful book of my authorship which deal with the management and results of the expeditions to the Far East of which

he had charge."(20)

Upon publication of **Explorations in Bible Lands**, Peters' and Jastrow's colleagues felt compelled to enter the fray. They generally considered the book highly egotistical; Columbia Semitics Professor John D. Prince, who had set out with the first expedition but who had to return because of illness, told the 1903 A.O.S. meeting that Hilprecht ignored, belittled or ridiculed the work of his superiors and colleagues. Harvard Professor George Foote Moore concluded, "It is a book no American can read without being ashamed."(21)

Early in 1905, Peters questioned the veracity of Hilprecht's claim to have discovered the Temple Library. He charged that the antiquities referred to in the text (including the Lushtamar letter) were purchased (not excavated) as much as eleven years before Hilprecht's announced delivery, and that they might not have come from Nippur at all. Peters and Jastrow reserved judgment on whether the 1900 expedition actually discovered the Temple Library. They contended that Hilprecht's use of evidence did not support the claim.

There were other charges. Jastrow accused his colleague of creating misleading impressions concerning his role in the discovery (most tablets had been excavated and packed before Hilprecht's arrival at Nippur on March 1, 1900). Others suggested that Hilprecht's claim to have personally presented the University with the many antiquities discovered obscured the real situation. Since Turkish law prohibited the export of excavated antiquities, the Pennsylvania and Turkish authorities created the

fiction that the Turkish Sultan had made Hilprecht such a gift in return for services rendered at the Imperial Museum at Constantinople where Hilprecht served as Curator. In reality, Hilprecht's critics claimed, the antiquities constituted the University's rightful share of the expedition's proceeds.(22) As the controversy proceeded, other charges came to light and American orientalists and University of Pennsylvania authorities agreed on the necessity for some sort of a judicatory procedure to clear the air.

The mechanism chosen, a committee composed of the Provost and Trustees, although apparently agreed to by all parties, failed to settle the matter; indeed as a lay body attempting to render judgment on the proper and improper use of scholarly evidence it could not have done so. The Committee accepted Hilprecht's argument that **Explorations**, as a "popular" book, did not have to conform to strict scholarly standards. "He was not dealing with the results of any expedition, his theme being the general subject of what all the expeditions has yielded, which made it proper that he should discuss tablets that had been purchased as well as those that had been excavated. Similarly, the committee dismissed the critics' skepticism about the Temple Library's existence as having "no other foundation than impatience that publication of the results of the several expeditions has not yet been made." The Committee did not consider the possibility that announcement of the discovery might have been withheld pending publication of supporting evidence. Finally, the committee concluded that Hilprecht properly dealt with the antiquities given him by the Turkish government. The committee focused on an ancillary question of whether he improperly retained

any antiquities which should have been turned over to the University. It did not address the issue of whether Hilprecht improperly claimed the antiquities to have been his own.(23)

The University's announcement of Hilprecht's full exoneration failed to silence his critics; its failure to publish the full hearing proceedings only exacerbated matters. Critics frequently employed the term "whitewash" in connection with the hearings, and most American Assyriologists viewed the Trustees' report as at best inadequate. Hilprecht continued to claim that the existence of a Temple Library at Nippur "is now accepted as an established fact by scholars." Jastrow, viewing such a statement as a continuing provocation, circularized his colleagues concerning its veracity. David Gordon Lyon replied that he could not accept the claim of its existence because "I have seen no evidence," adding that "I am in an open frame of mind awaiting the evidence."(24) The other Assyriologists replied in a similar vein; Lyon's response stands out only because several days later he requested that Jastrow return the letter. Lyon stated that during the course of the recent hearings Hilprecht had invited him to Philadelphia to examine tablets which Hilprecht said demonstrated the Library's existence. He decided he could not make a public statement without accepting the invitation. Perhaps more to the point, he also noted that the Turkish authorities had under consideration a Harvard petition for a firman for excavation in Palestine. "For me to join in a movement against H., or even to seem to do so," he told Jastrow, "would surely make him an enemy, and so far as he has influence at Constantinople, that influence might be used to defeat our firman." Shortly

thereafter, Harvard received its firman; in the subsequent controversy, collegial criticism of Lyon's conspicuous silence constituted the price he paid for a project which "lies near my heart."(25)

Given the divisiveness prevalent among American orientalists only a decade or two before, Lyon's demurrer was strikingly exceptional. In April, 1905, Peters read a paper on the Hilprecht case to the American Oriental Society; at its 1906 meeting, Jastrow did the same. When Hilprecht failed to respond to either paper (he was testifying at the University of Pennsylvania hearing at the time of the 1905 A.O.S. meeting), sixteen prominent American orientalists, stating that the controversy "allows the gravest imputations upon the integrity of American scholarship to rest uncleared," asked Hilprecht for a "full and frank statement." Hilprecht declined, stating that he was about to leave for Europe, that such a statement would reopen a controversy officially terminated by the Pennsylvania trustees and that a forthcoming publication would address the matter further. The 1907 publication, **Mathematical, Meterological and Chronological Tablets from the Temple Library of Nippur**, did not clarify the issues to his critics' satisfaction.(26)

Soon after its publication, Richard Gottheil, Professor of Semitics at Columbia, and a friend of Jastrow's , initiated another round-robin emphasizing the book's evasion of charges. This time, the initiative met considerable resistance; mainly on the grounds of insufficient time to have read Hilprecht's book. "This only convinces me." wrote Gottheil in exasperation, "in what I have believed for a long time

that Americans are lacking in backbone. They enjoy a good bluffer in politics, in card-playing or anything else. Hilprecht is a good bluffer, in other words a liar. I really think that some of our colleagues admire him for the manner in which he creeps out of the hole."(27) As an alternative, **The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures** published the 1906 correspondence between the sixteen and Hilprecht.(28)

Shortly thereafter, Hilprecht appeared at a meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis held on the Pennsylvania campus. His opponents speculated that Hilprecht counted on the Society's failure to take any action concerning the affair, and thereupon claim a measure of vindication.(29) Instead, the Society on a close vote seconded the sixteen's request. Hilprecht, his position increasingly untenable, changed his stance soon after and promised to make a full disclosure.(30) In the Spring of 1908, Hilprecht published, with the Pennsylvania trustees' concurrence, the transcript of the 1905 hearing, a supplementary section responding to charges which had subsequently arisen and elaborating on those which had come up at the hearing, and an appendix containing responses to specific questions formulated earlier that year by the sixteen.(31)

Reading through this material, one commentator concluded that "Professor Hilprecht has deliberately misrepresented many of the facts in regard to the finds of the fourth expedition to Nippur" and that the volume makes no mention "of other facts likely to place Hilprecht's conduct in a less favorable light than that cast upon it by the findings of the trustees. But, we

believe, on the other hand, that not all the charges against Professor Hilprecht have been sustained..."(32) John Peters stated that "Hilprecht's answers...seem to me, while attempting to evade the real issues, to be in fact an admission of substantially everything alleged by me..."(33) The sixteen acknowledged receipt of Hilprecht's volume and wrote, "Without attempting to express an opinion on the facts at issue, we deem it best, in the interest of all concerned, that the incident be closed as speedily as possible."(34)

For three and a half years, the controversy had preoccupied American orientalists; they now resolved that the debate best end. They had, as they saw it, come strongly to the defense of American scholarship; the decision to terminate the conflict resulted, probably, less for a lack of backbone and more from a lack of further effective sanctions.(35) And no one failed to notice that the heretofore acrimonious debate had degenerated into outright vitriol. Jastrow freely used terms such as "willful deception," and attributed Hilprecht's statements and alleged misstatements to vanity and a need for publicity and recognition. "[His] is a sad case of a good scholar who has become morally corrupt," Jastrow wrote: elsewhere he used the term "moral degeneracy and utter dishonesty."(36)

Hilprecht replied in kind. Jastrow "has at times fed a hidden stream that has come to the surface in many a swamp and morass without willing disclosure to the parent source," he wrote. "Under the pretext of righteous indignation...he sets himself to work gradually to poison the minds of both laymen and scholars, who do not happen to be familiar with Assyriological discussions...[and makes] his personal

views to appear as facts, when they are but malicious insinuations and unjustifiable accusations."(37)

If any further action were to come, it would have to be initiated by university authorities, not by the field. For the time being, American orientalists remained content to let Hilprecht make the next move. They did not have long to wait.

In 1910, Hilprecht published a document from the Nippur tablet collection which he claimed went beyond standard Babylonian accounts of the Flood, and actually confirmed the Biblical rendering.(38) While Hilprecht's translation probably served to ingratiate himself further into pietistic circles in Philadelphia, his academic colleague adopted a critical view. John D. Prince charged that to obtain the parallel Hilprecht inserted a Biblical phrase unsupported by the mutilated tablet's extant language. Such a practice, he asserted, violated scholarly protocol and, "in so doing Hilprecht has largely injured the intereat and value of his discovery from a scientific point of view."(39)

Thus, the field remained ready to challenge Hilprecht's scholarship, but what about Pennsylvania's trustees? Although to that point they stood behind their 1905 report, local conditions had begun to change. The entire affair had proven bitterly divisive. Jastrow's perhaps not unbiased remark that few faculty members had anything to do with Hilprecht bears the ring of truth, since his colleagues were bound by the same rules of scholarly evidence which Hilprecht appeared to have flaunted.(40) Hilprecht's critics earlier suggested that pressure from university authorities led him to abandon his reliance upon the

published Trustees' report.(41) The trustees had come under increasing criticism for presuming to resolve a scholarly controversy and, as a pro-Hilprecht newspaper put it, their long-maintained secrecy made it appear "that wealth and social backing count for more than scholarship and truth."(42)

In 1903 Hilprecht had married the daughter of Samuel A. Crozier, a multi-millionaire mill owner, and Hilprecht's home subsequently became a fashionable gathering place for Philadelphia society. However, Hilprecht's local opponents were not without social connections and a 1910 newpaper headline announcing "Society Split over Babylonian Tablets" referred not to the A.O.S. or the S.B.L., but to the Philadelphia social elite.(43) The Trustees, on which the city's upper strata were well-represented, increasingly reflected this disharmony.(44) The Deluge tablet's publication reignited the dispute locally, and to many it appeared that the various controversies would never end. In fact, there would be only one more, one which would culminate in the trustee's acceptance of Hilprecht's resignation.

In the summer of 1910, while travelling in Europe, Hilprecht learned that his private office at the Museum had been entered and that materials in the Babylonian collection had been tampered with. In his formal report, he noted that the locks and keys to his office had been changed, that books and private papers had been disturbed, and most seriously that over 100 boxes of antiquities were "broken open, unpacked and partly removed to other rooms," and as a result "our objective proofs for the topographical situation and the actual establishment of the old and younger temple library in

certain mounds of the ruins...have almost entirely been destroyed and are irretrievably lost to science."(45) Hilprecht submitted his resignation in protest and called for a full investigation to determine who had entered his office and store rooms. "Thus far," he wrote, "I have been able only to ascertain that among other visitors Professor Jastrow was in my private office and Professor Barton of Bryn Mawr in the store rooms of the tablets." Contemporary newspaper accounts spoke of the actual theft and defacement of important tablets; however, Hilprecht's formal letter only requested an inventory to determine "whether any and how many of the tablets...are missing or have been used for unauthorized purposes..." Although the stage was set for another procedure similar to the 1905 affair, this time with Hilprecht as prosecutor and Jastrow and others as defendents, the trustees instead decided to accept Hilprecht's resignation.(46)

We may speculate here about the trustees' motives. The controversy had drained the university and its personnel of much time and energy. The university was about to change provosts and some may have seen Hilprecht's resignation as a way to avoid encumbering a new administration. But the most obvious reason for the resignation's acceptance was that the trustees found Hilprecht's charges unsubstantiated. Hilprecht's office had been entered by proper museum authorities who were concerned about the deteriorating condition of the tablets which had remained in the museum's damp basement for almost a decade. These officials repacked the tablets, they contended, so as not to destroy scientific evidence, but to preserve it. They noted that all box markings had been transcribed and that Hilprecht himself had earlier testified that the

tablets had been packed at Nippur without regard to the height of the stratum. They concluded that no damage or destruction occurred "except such as may have taken place while Dr. Hilprecht as Curator of the Babylonian Section, was in responsible control of them."(47) Another trustee committee determined that Hilprecht's lifetime right to catalogue and control publication of the Babylonian material granted by the trustees in recognition of Hilprecht's presentation of those tablets reverted to the university as a consequence of his resignation, despite his specific retention of that right in his resignation letter.(48) Hilprecht continued to press his case through a variety of channels; however, the trustees remained steadfast. And, any criticism of lay judgments in these matters had been compromised by Hilprecht's repeated invocation of the trustees' ultimate authority when their decision supported his position in 1905.

The scholarly world subsequently heard little from Hilprecht. He did issue two additional volumes of inscriptions, although not under the aegis of the University of Pennsylvania. After a year's travel, he lived in Germany, returning to Philadelphia after World War I to become a naturalized citizen. He died in 1925.

Subsequent generations of scholars, indeed, even contemporary enemies, recognized Hilprecht's erudition, technical skill and careful scholarship. George Barton, in his **Dictionary of American Biography** sketch, deemed his overall influence on American Assyriology "great and beneficial," citing his teaching excellence, his skill in copying inscriptions accurately and attractively, and the overall high

quality of his publications. More than one colleague lamented that Hilprecht's hubris compromised the career of an important scholar.(49)

Nippur subsequently remained unexplored until after World War II, when the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Chicago undertook a joint mission; subsequently, the latter institution assumed sole responsiblity. Scholars eventually demonstrated that the bulk of the tablets unearthed by the Pennsylvania expedition, produced by schoolboys learning Sumerian, came from a section comprised of private dwellings, quite possibly the students' homes. Most others came from a palace archive or the Kassite governor of Nippur.(50)

The Hilprecht story has intrinsic interest because of the personalities, drama and stakes involved, but it also demonstrates a significant milepost in the growth of Semitics in America. Hilprecht's competitiveness and egocentrism may have typified the field in 1890, when most practitioners had just returned from Germany and experienced considerable insecurity concerning their positions. But, by 1910 it looked out of place. "If in the business world efforts are now being made to get rid of dishonorable methods," wrote Jastrow, "we scholars ought not, by our silence, to countenance them."(51) "Scientific dishonesty is worse than business dishonesty," Gottheil observed, "because scientists are supposed to have renouned the world for the purpose of living up to their ideals,"(52) But, perhaps more than an academic manifestation of the progressive impulse, both academics and laity implicitly understood that the Hilprecht affair marked an important change in the relationship of American and

European scholarship.

In his initial statement to the 1905 investigating committee, Morris Jastrow testified that Carl Bezold, Assyriological Professor at Heidelberg, first suggested that the fourth Babylonian expedition might have uncovered an archive rather than a literary library. Soon after, other European scholars relying on Hilprecht's publications, assumed the existence of a literary library; indeed one German scholar reproduced a purchased tablet as having been found at Nippur.(53) Jastrow's testimony constantly referred to erroneous impressions given to European scholars by Hilprecht, and insisted that his only conscious motives for moving against his colleague were "the desire to maintain the highest standard of accuracy, truthfulness and honesty that have always characterized American scholarship and an earnest zeal for the name of the University, which is unfortunately involved in the conduct of which, in my opinion, Dr. Hilprecht has been guilty."(54) In Hilprecht, Jastrow saw a threat to the considerable recognition accorded to American scholarship over the previous two decades.

Hilprecht well understood these terms of battle, and couched his defense in similar terms. Hugo Radau, a former Hilprecht student who shortly after the 1905 hearings would be retained as Hilprecht's assistant, testified at those hearings that "...the University of Pennsylvania will be in future times the Mecca of all Assyriologists...[and will] erect for itself a monument unequalled by no other, if she goes on in her noble work led by such a scholar and man as Professor Hilprecht is..."(55) After his vindication, Hilprecht received from the Turkish Sultan the golden order of

the Liakkat, its highest honor, "as a protest," wrote Hilprecht, "against the miserable intrigues against me in Philadelphia last spring and as a public acknowledgement of my discovery of the temple library of Nippur and the manner in which I defended it last spring." Hilprecht also reported to a Pennsylvania trustee that "numerous French, German, British and Austrian scholars as well as Turks expressed disbelief that "such an attack by members of the University of Pennsylvania against its own honor could have been tolerated." He also let it be known that the Gerna Emperor "has expressed a desire to see all my publications on the Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania and has accepted them since".(56)

In 1909, not long after Hilprecht's lengthy defense was published, there appeared a festschrift celebrating Hilprecht's fiftieth birthday and twenty-fifth anniversary of his doctorate. Its contributors included only one American (Radau), but nearly thirty European academics.(57) Decisions on inclusions and exclusions were conscious and involved Hilprecht; the list of European scholars included several that Jastrow had cited as being misled by Hilprecht's remarks.(58)

Hilprecht's American colleagues fired their own salvos to the other side,(59) but also reminded Hilprecht that he ultimately had to answer to them. "I cannot well see," Charles Lanman wrote Hilprecht, "how anything short of that [a statement that Hilprecht laid himself 'open to just criticism'] will reinstate you in the good opinion of men whose opinion, for my part, I should value the most if I were in your place."(60)

During the course of the controversy, and perhaps as a result of it, American orientalists no longer turned to their European colleagues to set standards; in fact, one can almost see the tide turning againt Hilprecht as he increasingly resorted to foreign support.

In 1911, after the trustees' acceptance of Hilprecht's resignation and their refusal to continue his exclusive access to the Babylonian collection, Hilprecht and Radau mounted a campaign among European scholars; they explicitly excluded solicitation of aid from their American colleagues.(61) The resulting round robin contained thirty-nine names including most scholars who had contributed to the Hilprecht Anniversary Volume.(62) Apparently basing their understanding of the events upon statements made by Radau, the Europeans called the events leading to the resignation "an international public scientific affair." The thirty-nine claimed to understand that Hilprecht resigned in protest against the "arbitrary influence...which was and is an insult to every scientific conception and treatment." They also deplored the concomitant cessation of his and Radau's publications which had begun to furnish "new and irrefutable proof that the large number of tablets still lying unpublished in the Philadelphia museums form part of a real temple library."(63)

The round robin proved, if anything, counterproductive. A letter published in a contemporary newspaper mused over whether a German university would tolerate the public interference of American professors and concluded that a sorry state of affairs would result if in each dispute between professor and administration and latter's course of

action "were to be dictated by foreigners."(64) Provost Edgar F. Smith, who replaced Provost Harrison in 1911 and who along with Harrison had sat on the panel which exonerated Hilprecht in 1905, criticized the Europeans for accepting Radau's extreme representations without inquiring into their veracity.(65) He stated that "...It was hard for us to overlook what, in the case of less eminent correspondents, we should have resented as a grave breach of academic comity." Smith enclosed a copy of the Trustee report exonerating the university authorities and concluded that, "There are, as you well know, certain situations in which an institution of learning must be content to forego the services even of the most eminent scholar."(66) The trustees further noted that several letters from various denominations "appeared to have been based upon the letter of certain European scholars;" they could not have failed to note that, save Radau, no American scholar, even among those who failed to join the sixteen's "attack," saw any need to rally to his support.

The Hilprecht controversy permitted American Semiticists to arrive at a modus vivendi among themselves and to learn the virtues and necessity of disciplinary cooperation, lessons which served them well in times of feast and famine. It enabled those American orientalists who studied with European masters to declare independence and, most important, allowed for evolution of their conception of proper scholarly norms. American scholarship could serve, especially, as a corrective to German excess. "...When we were discovering the antiquities of Sargon, his actual inscriptions in Babylonia," recalled Peters, "a distinguished Berlin Assyriologist was publishing a

work in which he proved Sargon to be a myth and in which Babylonia chronology was reduced to the same sorry pass as that of the Bible in the hands of its critics."(67) The German born and educated H. V. Hilprecht served as a symbol for everything American Semiticists rejected in continental scholarship. Restraint in judgment, wrote one orientalist, is "as essential to progress as direct contributions to knowledge, the guiding hand that does not permit the steed of progress to leap the fence but keeps it to the road."(68)

NOTES

1 H.V. Hilprecht, **Explorations in Bible Lands during the 19th Century** (Philadelphia: A. J. Holman and Company, 1903).

2 William Rosenau, "Semitic Studies in American Colleges," **Central Conference of American Rabbis Yearbook** (1896): 110.

3 William Hayes Ward, "Retrospect and Prospect," **Hebraica** 5 (October 1888): 81.

4 John P. Peters, "Thirty Years' Progress in Semitics," in **Thirty Years of Oriental Studies Issued in Commemoration of Thirty Years of Activity of the Oriental Club of Philadelphia**, editor Roland G. Kent (Philadelphia: Intelligencer Printing Company, 1918), p. 25.

5 See University of Pennsylvania, Trustees Minutes, 6 July 1886, 13:269; Ibid., 7 September 1886, p. 278, and 2 November 1886, p. 282. See also Jastrow to Lyon, September, 1886, David Gordon Lyon Letters, ca. 1884-1913, Harvard University Archives, HUG 1541. On Hilprecht, see **Dictionary of American Biography**, s.v. "Hilprecht, Herman Volrath."

6 Jastrow to Lyon, 26 November 1886, David Gordon Lyon Letters, Harvard University Archives, HUG 1541. "I do not wish to come into conflict with Hilprecht--in whose interest this step is being

contemplated--but so long as I have accepted the position of lecturer for one year, I think it decidedly unjust for the Trustees to establish a chair meanwhile and put somebody else in."

7 Jastrow to Pepper, 1 December 1886, University of Pennsylvania Archives, "Archives General-1886 Applications for Positions" file.

8 University of Pennsylvania, Trustees Minutes, 7 December 1886, p. 285, and 4 January 1887, p. 290.

9 Rosenau, "Semitic Studies," p. 113.

10 Robert F. Harper to William Harper, 15 April 1902, University Presidents' Papers, Special Collections, University of Chicago Library, Box 37, file 15.

11 Harper to W. R. Harper, 11 June 1892, Ibid.

12 Charles Breasted, **Pioneer to the Past** (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1943), pp. 28-29, 122, 131-32; and Robert Harper to William R. Harper, 29 March 1892, University Presidents' Papers, Special Collections, University of Chicago Library, Box 37, file 15.

13 Hilprecht to Pepper, 1 November 1889, University of Pennsylvania Archives, "Archives General-Collegiate Department 1889" file.

14 "Arrangement proposed as feasible in regard to the Semitic Department," 24 June 1892, University of Pennsylvania Archives, "Archives

General-Collegiate Department 1892" file.

15 See Jastrow to Pepper, 15 November 1888, Nippur Expedition Files, Museum Archives, University of Pennsylvania, document 9, and Minutes of Babylonian Committee, 4 February 1892, Ibid., document 194.

16 John P. Peters, **Nippur or Explorations and Adventures on the Euphrates**, (New York and London: G. Putnam's Sons, 1897), 1:1.

17 H. V. Hilprecht, editor, **The So-Called Peters-Hilprecht Controversy** (Philadelphia: A. J. Holman and Company, 1908), p. 315.

18 Hilprecht, **Explorations in Bible Lands**, p. 300.

19 **New York Times**, January 1908. (Copy in Hilprecht Papers, University of Pennsylvania Archives, 1910 file.)

20 Hilprecht, editor, **Peters-Hilprecht Controversy**, p. 315.

21 "The American Oriental Society, April 22, 1903," **Nation** 76 (30 April 1903), 76 (1974): 352.

22 See H. V. Hilprecht, editor, **Peters-Hilprecht Controversy**, passim; Morris Jastrow, "Did the Babylonian Temples have Libraries?" **Journal of the American Oriental Society** 27 (August 1906): 147-82; John P. Peters, **Hilprecht's Answer** (New York: 1908); and **Dictionary of American Biography**, s.v. "Hilprecht, Herman Volrath." The

affair was extensively covered by the contemporary press. See especially the **Philadelphia Ledger**, the **Philadelphia Evening Bulletin** and the **Nation.**

23 Cf. Hilprecht's statement to the Committee that "The permits granted by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan for excavations at Nippur for 1893 and the following years were issued to me personally as an official of the Imperial Ottoman Museum, and all the antiquities unearthed at Nippur since 1893 which have been received by the University were presented to me 'by an exceptional act of grace' on the part of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan 'in recognition of the services rendered and of the manifold sacrifices made' by me 'for the Imperial Museum.'" (Hilprecht, editor, **Peters-Hilprecht Controversy**, p. 41). The Committee viewed the practice as routine ("The responsible officer of [the Turkish] Government, after selecting at Constantinople such objects produced by the excavations as are desired for the Imperial Turkish Museum, frequently gives large numbers of the remaining objects to the person who has unearthed them. He is, of course, bound to turn these over to the body under whose auspices the expedition was organized.") but failed to chastise Hilprecht for his language. The distinction would take on more than semantic importance in 1910. (Ibid., p. 269) The size of Hilprecht's bequest of antiquities to Jena has led scholars to speculate that he may have indeed retained significant amounts of Nippur material.

24 Jastrow to Lyon, 26 March 1906; and Lyon to

Jastrow, 30 March 1906, David Gordon Lyon Letters, Harvard University Archives, HUG 1541.

25 Hilprecht to Lyon, 15 April 1905, reprinted in Hilprecht, editor, **Peters-Hilprecht Controversy**, pp. 147-48; Lyon to Jastrow, 31 March 1906 and 7 April 1906; David Gordon Lyon Letters, Harvard University Archives, HUG 1541.

26 (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 1907). Hilprecht's preface did speak to the issue of the library's existence. However, one critic wrote, "It is proved to contain no answer whatever to the charges of falsification, and so far as it bore upon those charges at all, rather increased than diminished their gravamen." "The Hilprecht Case," **Nation** 85 (21 November 1907): 466. Hilprecht published a number of favorable reviews of his book in an appendix to the **Peters-Hilprecht Controversy**, pp. 340-53.

27 Gottheil to Peters, 4 February 1907; Gottheil to Jastrow, 25 February 1907, 7 March 1907, and 25 March 1907 (source of quotation); Gottheil to Lanman, 7 March 1907; Gottheil to Robert Harper, 18 March 1907; and Gottheil to Haupt, 18 March 1907 and 25 March 1907; Letter-Book of Prof. Richard J. H. Gottheil, 1906-08, Columbiana Library, Columbia University.

28 (October, 1907) 24(1): 92-94. The sixteen included Francis Brown of Union Theological Seminary, Maurice Bloomfield of Johns Hopkins, Richard Gottheil of Columbia, Charles C. Torrey of Yale, Robert Harper of Chicago, Hanns Oertel of

Yale, George F. Moore of Harvard, E. Washburn Hopkins of Yale, Crawford H. Toy of Harvard, James R. Jewett of Chicago, William Hayes Ward, Paul Haupt of Johns Hopkins, Daniel C. Gilman of Johns Hopkins, A. V. Williams Jackson of Columbia, John W. White of Harvard and Charles R. Lanman of Harvard.

29 Jastrow to Lyon, 4 January 1908 and 24 January 1908, David Gordon Lyon Letters, Harvard University Archives, HUG 1541.

30 See **Philadelphia Public Ledger**, 1 January 1908. Hilprecht initially reissued his 1906 reply to the sixteen in response to the SBL resolution. He changed his position several days later.

31 Hilprecht, editor, **Peters-Hilprecht Controversy**, passim; see also Gottheil to Jastrow, 2 January 1908 and 29 January 1908, Letter-Book of Prof. Richard J. H. Gottheil, 1906-08, Columbiana Library, Columbia University.

32 "Professor Hilprecht's Defense," **Nation** 86 (7 May 1908): 426.

33 Peters, **Hilprecht's Answer**, p. 15.

34 Charles R. Lanman et al. to Hilprecht, 15 May 1908, copy in "A Letter from Professor Charles R. Lanman," **American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures**, vol 24, no. 4 (July 1908): 370.

35 Gottheil himself noted this. After the SBL vote he wrote, "It seems to me that nothing further can

be done by either of our two societies other than to take Hilprecht's name off from the list of members..." Gottheil to Jastrow, 2 January 1908, Letter-Book of Richard J. H. Gottheil, 1906-08, Columbiana Library, Columbia University.

36 Jastrow to Lyon, 19 March 1905 and 10 April 1906, David Gordon Lyon Letters, Harvard University Archives, HUG 1541.

37 Hilprecht, editor, **Peters-Hilprecht Controversy**, p. 317.

38 H. V. Hilprecht, **The Earliest Version of the Babylonian Deluge Story and the Temple Library of Nippur** (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1910).

39 John D. Prince and Frederick A. Vanderburgh, "The New Hilprecht Deluge Tablet," **The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures** 26 (July 1910): 304. See also **Encyclopedia Britannica**, 11th edition, s.v. "Nippur: The Deluge Fragment," by Leonard William King.

40 Jastrow to Lyon, 10 April 1906, David Gordon Lyon Letters, Harvard University Archives, HUG 1541.

41 Jastrow to Lyon, 24 January 1908, Ibid.

42 **New York Evening Post**, 21 January 1908. A **Nation** editorial, published in an issue dated two days later, used virtually identical wording to this pro-Hilprecht editorial, but took an anti-Hilprecht stance. See **Nation** 86 (23 January

1908): 71.

43 **New York Times**, 27 November 1910, p.5.

44 See E. Digby Baltzel, **Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of A National Upper Class** (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958), p. 324. "The University of Pennsylvania reached the zenith of its prestige as a Proper Philadelphia institution at the turn of the century. The trustees and principal benefactors of the University were primarily composed of wealthy and fashionable citizens..."

45 Hilprecht to the Board of Managers of the Museum of Archaeology, University of Pennsylvania, 12 November 1910, Museum Archives, University of Pennsylvania.

46 See University of Pennsylvania, Trustees Minutes, 15 November 1910 and 6 December 1910.

47 **In Re Resignation of Dr. Herman V. Hilprecht: Report of the Committee To Whom Were Referred by the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania Communications Respecting the Alleged Injuries Done to Scientific Material** (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1911).

48 University of Pennsylvania, Trustees Minutes, 4 April 1911, pp. 202-03.

49 "Hilprecht, Herman Volrath," **Dictionary of American Biography**, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961) 5:58-9.

50 See Edward Chiera, **Sumerian Lexical Texts from the Temple School at Nippur** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926), p. 1 and Donald E. McCown and Richard C. Haines, assisted by Donald P. Hansen, **Nippur: I Temple of Enlil, Scribal Quarter, and Soundings** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), pp. 148-49.

51 Jastrow to Lyon, 2 April 1906, David Gordon Lyon Letters, Harvard University Archives, HUG 1541.

52 Gottheil to Jastrow, 7 March 1907, Letter-Book of Prof. Richard J. H. Gottheil, 1906-08, Columbiana Library, Columbia University.

53 Hilprecht, editor, **Peters-Hilprecht Controversy**, pp. 27, 106. The major protagonists failed to adhere to rigid definitions in distinguishing an "archive" from a "library." For a discussion, see Mogens Weitemeyer, "Archive and Library Technique in Ancient Mesopotamia," **Libri**, Hilprecht, editor, 6 (1956): 217-38.

54 Ibid., p. 105.

55 Ibid., p. 159.

56 Hilprecht to Samuel F. Houston, 20 June 1905, Museum Archives, University of Pennsylvania.

57 **Hilprecht Anniversary Volume: Studies in Assyriology and Archaeology Dedicated to Herman V. Hilprecht upon the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of His Doctorate and His Fiftieth**

Birthday (July 28) by His Colleagues, Friends and Admirers (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1909).

58 Radau to Hilprecht, 9 August 1911, Museum Archives, University of Pennsylvania, "Nippur Expedition file 668."

59 Gottheil to Jastrow, 25 November 1907 and 29 November 1907, Letter-Book of Prof. Richard J. H. Gottheil, 1906-08, Columbiana Library, Columbia University. "The reason why I wished some unprejudiced account to go in a German paper," Gottheil wrote, "was the fact that German circles, especially such as are a little pietistic, are inclined to side with Hilprecht [letter of 29 November 1907]...probably because he is a German [letter of 25 November 1907]."

60 Lanman to Hilprecht, 21 March 1908, copy in Hilprecht, editor, **Peters-Hilprecht Controversy**, p. 331.

61 "With regard to your suggestion as to the American scholars," Radau wrote Hilprecht, "permit me to state the same as I did two or three years ago in connection with the Anniversary Volume, namely, let us ignore them! I do not want to put yourself and myself into the position of craving their support, to let them think that we need them and that we cannot do without them: it is better for us-for you and for me-not to do as you suggested in asking [Professor Heinrich] Zimmern to write to them..." Radau to Hilprecht, 9 August 1911, Museum Archives, University of Pennsylvania,

"Nippur Expedition file 668."

62 Another contributor, Halil Edhem, director of the Imperial Ottoman Museum in Constantinople, sent a separate letter.

63 "Letter from Professor Dr. H. Zimmern, Representing Certain European Scholars," August, 1911, in **In Re Resignation of Herman V. Hilprecht: Report of the Committee of Three**, p. 18.

64 Letter of Peggy Shippen, 12 November 1911, copy in Hilprecht Papers, University of Pennsylvania Archives, 1911 file.

65 "That all this was brought about intentionally and for a purpose," stated the letter published by the trustees as having been written by Radau to the Europeans, "will be plain to you and need not be stated here, for every volume of the Temple Library Texts published is a new accusation and demonstration that the former accusers of the Professor were, as regards their ability to judge or determine the character of the tablets, found absolutely incompetent. This was to be prevented. To do so, they gained the ear of the former Provost of the University and through him had the Museum reorganized, the tablets taken away from us, the existence of the Library wiped out-if possible." ("Copy of Letter Purporting to Have Been Addressed by Dr. Hugo Radau to Various European Scholars," in **In Re Resignation of Herman V. Hilprecht: Report of the Committee of Three**, p.34). The letter went on to assert

that former Provost Harrison accepted Hilprecht's resignation while a lame duck provost after being forced out of his office, that Harrison kept a working majority of trustees by not filling the places of resigned members and that "all of the most influential and best class of citizens of Philadelphia are sympathizing with the Professor and are for him." (Ibid., p. 35)

66 **In Re Resignation of Dr. Herman V. Hilprecht: Copies of Letters Addressed, at the Direction of the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, by the Provost of the University to Various Correspondents and Inquirers** (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1911), p. 2.

67 Peters, "Thirty Years' Progress in Semitics," p. 32. "...Semitic scholars," he continued, "as we know them are not quite so wild and lawless as they were before 1888, and partly, I think, that is due to the increasing part which we have taken in training scholars in that field." (Ibid., p. 47).

68 E. Washburn Hopkins, "Thirty Years of Indo-European Studies," in **Thirty Years of Oriental Studies**, Kent, editor, p. 79.

Church, State, and Higher Education: College Government in the American Colonies and States before 1820

Jurgen Herbst

The early decades of the nineteenth century marked the beginning of a new chapter in the history of universities and other institutions of higher learning on the continents of Europe and North America. In Europe the founding and development of the University of Berlin signalled the birth of the modern state university. The Dartmouth College decision by the United States Supreme Court likewise heralded a new beginning, although of a very different nature; in the United States, private colleges and universities appeared side by side with the public institutions.(1)

On both continents the two preceding centuries were periods of transition. In Europe the Reformation had cut the university loose from its medieval moorings. With the disappearance of Papacy and Empire, the corporations of masters and scholars had lost the protectors of their autonomy. Once the turmoil of the Reformation had subsided and a new political order had been established by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, the scholarly corporations sought shelter in the harbors of territorial sovereignties. Civil and ecclesiastical

loyalties were determined by their secular lords: cuius regio, eius religio, Territorial and confessional authority replaced the autonomy of the universal studium.

Institutions of higher education in the English speaking colonies on the north American continent had been schools of the Reformation from the outset.(2) In founding the first three colleges in Massachusetts, Virginia, and Connecticut respectively, the provincial authorities of state and church jointly took the initiative in each case. Harvard College was created in 1636 by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony and, as a corporation of president, fellows, and treasurer, was placed under the oversight of a board consisting of ministers and magistrates in equal parts. The College of William and Mary received its charter in 1693 from the British Crown upon application by James Blair, commissary of the Anglican church in Virginia, with support of the Virginia legislature. While the charter provided for the eventual incorporation of a president and six masters, the real power of government remained in the hands of a board of trustees composed of Blair, the colony's lieutenant governor, and sixteen Virginia gentlemen chosen by the legislature. In Connecticut Yale College originated with a group of clergymen who in 1701 were incorporated by the colony's General Court as The Rector and Fellows of the Collegiate School. These trustees neither taught nor lived in the college. Instead they resided in New Haven and neighboring towns. For nearly a century they quarreled with the General Court over the right to remain the sole governors of the college. Finally, in 1792, they lost the battle when a number of legislators were placed on the governing board. Cuius regio, eius

religio: joint secular-ecclesiastical college government by the established civil and church authorities prevailed in the English colonies. Together with Anglican clergymen in Virginia and Puritan ministers in New England, colonial legislators saw to it that an independent academic corporation would not exist in North America.

There were other reasons for this as well. The autonomy of independent educational corporations, such as the English colleges of Oxford and Cambridge, rested on the income from their endowments. But endowments were not to be had in the New World. Colonies existed not to consume surplus wealth but to produce it for the benefit of their trading company and mother country. While the colonial colleges did attract individual gifts, chiefly from abroad, and while they sponsored fund-raising journeys of agents to Europe, they had to depend for their funding on public money raised at home. The General Courts of both Massachusetts and Connecticut promised and granted tax funds, and the Crown assigned income from customs revenues to the College of William and Mary. In return for their support, these governments required an accounting, a visitation, as it was then called.

Another reason for the absence of independent academic corporations was the scarcity of mature scholars to be entrusted with the financial management of a college. At Harvard the original corporation consisted of fellows who served as college tutors. These young men were graduate assistants who had only recently escaped the status of college students themselves. As time went on the Overseers insisted that they be replaced with ministers and businessmen

who were well known and respected members of the greater Boston community. In this way the college corporation became less and less academic and, as far as its composition was concerned, quite indistinguishable from the Board of Overseers. College government by non-academics became the norm.

The government of the Reformation colleges in the New World, then, resembled their European counterparts. William and Mary, an Anglican foundation, bore the imprint of both England and Scotland. James Blair intended to keep the academic corporation of English-trained masters under the control of a board of visitors, an arrangement for which he had seen a precedent at Edinburgh where the city council governed the college. Harvard and Yale, the two earliest Puritan foundations of New England, took their cue from the Calvinist-Reformed institutions of Europe. Their overseers and trustees corresponded to the inspectors of Geneva, the scholarchs of Strassburg, the curators of Leyden, and the town councillors of Edinburgh. From these roots in Presbyterian-Reformed experience with institutional government has come the system of external lay governing boards that to this day remains the characteristic form of college and university government in the United States.

By the middle of the 18th century, however, the American experience with the government of institutions of higher education began to depart significantly from the European model. Demographic realities made it increasingly difficult to observe the principle of cuius regio, eius religio. Who, after all, governed the American colonies? Were one to argue on behalf of Crown and Parliament, then the established churches

everywhere and the provincial college could have been under Anglican control. As for the colleges, however, this should be said only of the College of William and Mary and of King's College (the present-day Columbia University), chartered in New York by the Crown in 1754. At the College of Philadelphia, chartered in 1755, Anglicans shared a leading role with Presbyterians. Presbyterians and Congregationalists were in fact dominant in the largest number of colonial colleges. They governed at Harvard and Yale where they also ruled the established churches of their colonies. They also sponsored the College of New Jersey (today's Princeton) and Dartmouth College in New Hampshire; the one chartered in 1746, the other in 1769. In addition to Anglicans, Presbyterians and Congregationalists, Baptists entered the field in 1765 with the opening of the College in the Province of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations (today's Brown University), and the Dutch Reformed obtained a college of their own in New Jersey. This was Queen's College (the present-day Rutgers, the State University), chartered in 1766. In each case the governing party varied from colony to colony and, with notable exceptions in the cases of King's College and Queen's College, reflected the dominant denomiantion among the colony's residents. It was a case where the religion of the people rather than of the sovereign determined the religon of the college.

More to the point, however, was the fact that the denominational allegiances as well as the ethnic backgrounds of the colonists varied greatly even within individual colonies. The key province in this regard was Pennsylvania. Its proprietor, William Penn, had envisaged the land as an asylum for the poor of Europe, a refuge for the persecuted of the Old World. As a

consequence Pennsylvania became a haven for English Quakers and Swedish Lutherans, for German Pietists of varied persuasions, and for dissenters from majority denominations throughout Europe. But even older colonies like Puritan Massachusetts had begun to receive Quakers, Baptists, and Anglicans who, under England's 1689 Act of Toleration, claimed equal treatment with the adherents of New England's established Congregational churches. Colleges under joint secular-ecclesiastic oversight thus had to come to grips with a mandated policy of toleration. And that was no easy matter. It required the dominant party to refrain from imposing attendance requirements at religious worship and instruction unless they were conducted in a non-denominational fashion. It obliged the colleges to admit students without regard to their preferences in worship and to avoid any form of discrimination concerning a student's religious persuasion. Under these conditions, could colonists any longer think in the traditional terms of established churches and colleges?

Far more compelling an explanation for the colleges' reluctance to erect barriers against religious non-conformity than the English policy of toleration was the colleges' desire, even need, to attract as many students as possible. It was not until the early 1760s that the annual number of graduates from all six colonial colleges reached one hundred, and the average attendance at each of them stood near sixty. For provincial colleges serving as recruiting and training grounds of a colony's future elite, a narrow denominational viewpoint was ill-advised. Legislators and college trustees deemed it in a colony's best interests and, for that matter, to the

advantage of a colony's majority denomination, to attract as large a number of young men as possible to their college. Only then could the secular authorities hope to find a steady supply of qualified future professionals, and church officials expect to attract well-educated newcomers to their fold. Toleration with preferment, a college open to members of all sects yet under the control of a preferred denomination, thus became the policy guiding American college government in the 18th century.

Toleration with preferment was closely linked to the view that colonial colleges, as provincial institutions, enjoyed and deserved a monopoly on higher education in their colonies. Harvard was the Massachusetts college just as King's College was to serve New York and the College of William and Mary served the interests of all Virginians. Attacks against this view of a collegiate monopoly occurred several times during the colonial period. All but one were defeated. In 1762 an attempt to found a college in western Massachusetts was repulsed by the Harvard Overseers in order to prevent a rival to their institution. The Overseers stated that Harvard was "properly the College of the Government," and the new college in the west "would not only be quite unnecessary, but really prejudicial to Harvard College." A Connecticut missionary, Eleazar Wheelock, who wanted to transform his Indian school into a college, had to move his establishment to New Hampshire where it emerged as Dartmouth College and became that colony's provincial college. The Connecticut legislators did not favor his school as a potential rival of Yale's. In Rhode Island too a plan for a competitor in Newport to the provincial college in

Providence could not overcome the obstacles placed in its path. Toleration with preferment was a way also to undercut all arguments for the necessity or equity of providing colleges for dissenters from the dominant or established church. There was, the argument went, no discrimination against dissenters under the toleration with preferment formula.

New Jersey was the one colony in which the provincial college monopoly was broken. Here, in 1766, Governor William Franklin signed the charter of Queen's College. The charter placed members of the Dutch Reformed Church on the governing board together with officers of the colonial government. Queen's College was charged with preparing young men for the ministry of the Dutch Reformed churches as well as with promoting "learning for the benefit of the community and advancement of the protestant religion of all denominations." Not being a provincial institution, Queen's College did not carry in its charter the usual phrase that forbade discrimination againt students on religious grounds. The chartering of Queen's as New Jersey's second college with the specific task of serving a particular group constituted a significant departure from the Reformation practice of founding monopolistic provincial colleges under the toleration with preferment scheme.

Other attempts, unsuccessful in each case, to do away with preferment took place in New York and Rhode Island. William Livingston waged a crusade in his newspaper, **The Independent Reflector**, to deny preferred position to Anglicans in the founding of King's College. His counterproposal of 1754 for a provincial college in New York placed the trustees

under the direct superintendence of the legislature, required them to submit annually their financial reports, by-laws, and curricular plans to the government, and ruled out any public instruction in religion. Livingston's was to be a purely secular public college. By removing official ecclesiastical representation in college government, Livingston had done away with the issue of preferment. In Rhode Island Ezra Stiles, minister of Newport's Second Congregational Church, moved in the opposite direction. In his proposal for a college in Newport Stiles recognized the Colony's four major religious groups - Baptists, Quakers, Congregationalists, and Anglicans. All four were to be involved in the college government. Stiles devised a plan for presidential and professorial appointments whereby all four denominations would draw their sequence of precedence by lot and thereafter follow through in rotation. Except for his Congregational and Newport friends Ezra Stiles obtained little support for his plan and the already established provincial College of Rhode Island retained its monopoly.(3)

Diversity of populations had been the major force to exert pressure on traditional forms of college government before the Revolution. After the Revolution the diverse energies of an expanding population continued and even increased this pressure. Freed of external coercion by the successful issue of the War for Independence, and unwilling to submit again to governmental restraint even of their own making, many Americans were unwilling and often unable to rely on the newly-founded state universities as the modern successors to the colonial provincial colleges. They were unwilling because they preferred to place college

projects in the hands of ministers and developers; they were unable because public institutions required agreement of many conflicting interests, and such agreements were hard to obtain. Philip Lindsley, president of the public University of Nashville, put it well when he said that public institutions with neither sect nor party "to praise, puff, glorify, and fight" for them were in "the worst possible position." They were neutral and therefore trusted and regarded by no one.(4) As a result, when peace returned in the early 1780s, the private American college made its appearance as the rival and companion of the public university.

Private colleges were of various kinds. Many, particularly in Virginia, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Tennessee, and South Carolina, grew out of Presbyterian-sponsored academies and, without the monopolistic endorsement as provincial or state college, practiced a policy of toleration or stewardship towards all denominations. Other religious groups followed this pattern and, in the early 19th century, generally maintained an open door policy towards students of other faiths. This was true for Methodist and Catholic foundations in the middle colonies as well as Congregational and Baptist colleges in New England. A second group of colleges owed their existence essentially to civic pride and the interests of land developers, urban promoters, and speculators. Sometimes called "booster colleges," these institutions were meant to attract settlers "of the better sort" with the promise of educational opportunities for their children.(5) Before 1820 we find them in Maryland, Ohio, and New York. They cannot always clearly be distinguished from the denominational foundations because in many cases denominational and civic

interests were interwined. A third kind of college, finally, was the degree-granting proprietary professional school. The University of Maryland was of this kind. It grew out of the College of Medicine of Maryland, a business enterprise of Baltimore physicians designed to train young doctors for a fee. For many years the university consisted of only a medical faculty.

The appearance in the United States immediately after the Revolution of private institutions of higher education, then, is the most significant fact for our understanding of the relationships that have developed in the United States among state, church, and higher education. Private colleges appeared in the United States not so much as a result of the official separation of state and church, of the abandonment of the idea of established territorial church, than as a demonstration of the pervasive reality of this idea in concrete institutional development. To protect and further encourage the separation of higher education and state, to allow colleges and universities to exist outside as well as inside the public sphere, required post facto legal certification and endorsement of what had aleady taken place. This endorsement was provided by John Marshall, chief justice of the United States Supreme Court, in his 1819 decision in the Dartmouth College Case.(6) Marshall likened a college corporation to a business corporation. It was a privately endowed enterprise rather than a public corporation such as towns or public universities. Marshall safeguarded the existence of a college as a private charitable corporation by placing its chartered rights under the protection of that clause in the United States Constitution guaranteeing the

inviolability of contracts. If American governments could invalidate contracts and charters by legislative enactment, then neither business nor colleges could feel safe from confiscation, and private enterprise would come to a halt. This, Marshall believed, would be fatal to the young nation! If one desired unrestrained commitment of all the country's energies to growth and development, then business and higher education must be left free to follow their own impulses. Thus the Supreme Court provided the legal support for private higher education, and the United States proceeded to write a new leaf in the centuries-long history of higher education.

In comparative perspective the Dartmouth decision in the United States and the plans of Wilhelm von Humbolt for the University of Berlin constitute sign-posts for new chapters in the history of universities. In Germany the 19th century witnessed the rise of the university as the state's central instrument for national development. In the United States the same century saw the parallel development of private and public institutions of higher education as the most efficient way to release the energies of a people for national growth and development. In Prussia, and later Germany, higher education remained exclusively a matter for the state to direct; in the United States it prospered in both the private and the public sectors, relying on the support and direction of both states and churches to make it useful to the nation and the people.

NOTES

1 This paper is a summary statement of the argument I present in my forthcoming book, **From Crisis to Crisis: American College Government**, 1636-1819 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). It was presented at the Third Annual Meeting of the International Association for the History of Education, Paris, September 27-30, 1981.

2 See my "The First Three American Colleges: Schools of the Reformation," **Perspectives in American History** 8 (1974), 7-52.

3 For text and analysis of the Newport college charter see my "The Charter for a Proposed College in Newport, Rhode Island: A Chapter in the History of Eighteenth Century Higher Education in America," **Newport History** 49 (Spring 1976): 25-49.

4 Richard Hofstadter and Wilson Smith, eds., **American Higher Education: A Documentary History**, 2 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), 1:379.

5 The concept of a "booster college" was introduced by Daniel J. Boorstin in **The Americans: The National Experience** (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 152-161.

6 4 Wheaton 517 (1819).

Education in Conflict: The Booker Washington Institute of Liberia

Donald Spivey

Industrial schooling spread beyond the boundaries of the United States. In the years immediately after World War I, black industrial education was being implanted in East, West, Central, and Southern Africa. Western powers were eager to find effective means to stabilize their African colonies, to thwart the upsurge of African aspirations, and maintain and foster a reliable and docile labor force. In short, the goal was to ensure white hegemony, and the industrial schooling idea fitted very well. It proved itself in the American South under the orchestration of Samuel Chapman Armstrong, the father of black industrial schooling and the founder of Hampton Institute in Hampton, Virginia, the prototype on which the other industrial schools were modeled. Booker T. Washington was Armstrong's star pupil, the paramount product of the industrial education idea, the founder of Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, and the master spokesman for accommodationism. Most responsible for disseminating industrial schooling throughout Africa was Thomas Jesse Jones, Education Director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, who was born in Wales and educated in the American

South. His articulation of the schoolhouse's potential contribution to the status quo struck a responsive chord among the colonizers of Africa, including the United States, whose major interest was in its former semi-colony, the West African Republic of Liberia.

There has been very limited research on industrial education in Africa. Kenneth James King's **Pan-Africanism and Education: A Study of Race Philanthropy and Education in the Southern States of America and East Africa** (1971), is by far the most extensive. Several articles have given attention to the impact of Booker T. Washington and industrial schooling in Africa. But none of these works examine industrial education in Liberia, although it was there, in 1929, that the most important industrial school in Africa was established--The Booker Washington Institute of Liberia (BWI). This was an institution entangled in American economic and foreign policy interests and the complexities of Liberian society.

The American backers of the Booker Washington Institute--The Phelps-Stokeses, the Rockefellers, the Firestones, and the American State Department, among others--had to learn, however, that the Republic of Liberia was not the American South and that the success of the school was contingent upon finding a common ground between American interests and Liberian aspirations. The ruling body of Liberia, the Americos, aided in founding BWI. The Liberian Government, which donated land for the institute in Kakata, supported the school because government members believed that their hegemony over the country would be strengthened by providing schooling to make the native masses a reliable and more efficient laboring class. At the

same time, Liberian nationalism was on the upswing. Despite the class-caste lines between Americos and natives, both groups considered themselves Liberians first and were fiercely proud of their nation and race. This translated into specific expectations for the Booker Washington Institute, its administration and staff--expectations that the American crusaders refused to meet. Conflicts arose between the school, the native student body, and the Americo-led Government.

The Booker Washington Institute officially opened in Kakata, Liberia, on March 17, 1929, under the principalship of James L. Sibley, a man in whom the American crusaders for industrial education in Africa had profound faith. Sibley was a Southerner, former State Agent of Negro Rural Schools in Alabama, a strong advocate of industrial schooling, and he was white. Sibley viewed Africa as an untamed frontier, an uncivilized continent of heathens. In many respects, Sibley was a product of his age and his Southern upbringing. Without a great deal of knowledge of Africa, he was convinced that Africans were like the black population of the South. He viewed black Americans as the white man's burden, a lesser race dependent on the guidance and good will of "the superior race." Transposing these views to Africa, Sibley believed that all Africa was "a backward land." The salvation for the Africans, like their Afro-American counterparts would, he concluded, come through proper education. What Africa needed, accordng to Sibley, was industrial schooling.(1)

Anson Phelps Stokes, Director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, while visiting the South met Sibley. He was so impressed with him and his views that he urged him to

consider taking the position as head of BWI. Sibley travelled to New York at Stokes' request. The New York State Colonization Society officially offered him the post as principal of BWI; he accepted and immediately set sail for Liberia. Sibley set as his first task the bringing of BWI into complete harmony with the local tribes and villages, and developing a firm working relationship with the Firestone plantations. He was not afforded the time to put his program on a solid footing. Before the end of his first year as head of BWI, Sibley died from yellow fever.(2)

There were several interim heads of BWI until the crusaders for industrial schooling appointed Paul Rupel as principal of the institute in 1936. Rupel was a man of much the same background as Sibley. He took charge with a zeal and determination to make BWI live up to its namesake. His concern was labor and industry, pure and simple. Rupel made a careful review of his staff, fired those who did not meet his expectations and praised those he felt were doing a good job. An example of those who met his expectations was Samuel Coles, whom he characterized as a "poor classroom teacher" but, in the more important category, "good at handling the natives at the rough work."(3)

Curriculum changes were made with stronger emphasis placed on work in the fields. Rupel insisted that students work longer hours and that they do so no matter what the conditions. He declared that if students "did not want to work in the rain they should not come" to this Institute. "They were losing so much time at this time of the year (the wet season) by stopping every time it rained and the school was the loser. They worked on the road for the Government and

at Firestone's in the rain so they should expect to work in the rain here."(4)

Rupel was determined to produce the best workers or none at all. As he reported to Thomas Jesse Jones, he would stick to the task until the job was done or "until snow flies at Booker Washington Institute." In one short year under his guidance, the Booker Washington Institute became the central institution for native education in Liberia. Its student body increased from sixty-eight students to over one hundred. The institution's enrollment represented most of the native tribes of Liberia: the Bassa, Busi, Kplle, Gbande, Kru, Mano, Mandingo, Grebo, Gizi, Gola, Arka, Guio, Kwana, Kongo, all had members attending BWI. It had new dormitories, a physical plant, well-constructed housing for the faculty, a serviceable library, a laboratory, tools and machinery. The school, indeed, was developing at a fantastic rate, producing valuable laborers for the Firestone plantations.(5)

Substantial impetus for the school's growth came from the Firestone organization. It provided specialists to aid in erecting buildings, machinery, tools, and just about anything else the Institute required. The Firestone plantations entertained all visitors to BWI on the school's behalf. When Jackson Davis of the New York State Colonization Society (NYSCS) and the Phelps-Stokes Fund came to inspect the Institute, he was met at the docks by BWI and Firestone officials and, in fact, spent most of his time "inspecting the rubber" rather than examining the school.(6)

The Firestone organization and BWI maintained a close working relationship. In 1936 a Firestone Plantation chief engineer stated that "the whole staff on the Plantation are always ready and eager to assist Mr. Rupel." The Firestone interests gave the school direct financial assistance. Next to the monies provided by the various philanthropic organizations such as the Phelps-Stokes Fund and the International Education Board, the Firestone company was Booker Washington's largest single contributor. Harvey Firestone and other crusaders for industrial schooling in Liberia vowed that all efforts should be made to develop the Washington Institute.(7)

The Firestone influence is revealed in the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Trustees of BWI for May 22, 1936. At that meeting the Board expressed its "many thanks" to the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company for its assistance. The secretary was requested to express to Harvey S. Firestone, Jr., the "deep appreciation of the Trustees of the Booker Washington Institute for his very generous gift which also was imperative to the realization of the building and equipment program now being carried out at the Institute." The Board could have waited until a later date when all its members were present and thanked Mr. Firestone in person, because he served as one of its members.(8)

As expected, the Institute provided more efficient workers for the Firestone plantations and served as an "example of Firestone goodwill" to the natives. As such, it served as one component of the necessary two ingredients for the company's continued success in Liberia. The government of that country provided the

other.(9)

Edwin James Barclay, the Americo-Liberian President of Liberia, worked in harmony with the Firestone harvest of his country's rubber and use of its native labor. He and other government officials viewed the Firestone plantations as good for the country. They concurred with the educational crusaders that the Firestone Company represented "high business principles in dealing with its employees as well as with the general public. Though the purpose of the organization in Liberia is avowedly economic and commercial, their sound business principles and methods have been maintained in all their Liberian activities. The company has been uniformly just and generous in dealing with native labor both as regards wages and conditions of employment." It was of little moral importance to the Americo-led Liberian government that the native workers on the Firestone plantations were paid one of the lowest wages in the world or that the revenue the country received from the harvest of the nation's rubber was based on an export tax that also was one of the lowest in the world. There is reason to believe that Jackson Davis of the NYSCS meant more than he wrote when he reported in confidence in 1935: "President Barclay stated that he had arrived at a satisfactory understanding with Mr. Firestone."(10)

The understanding between Barclay and Firestone worked to the advantage of the Firestone plantations and to the disadvantage of native labor. A few days after the meeting between the two men, President Barclay announced a road building program. A network of improved roads were to be built--one from Monrovia through Kakata and the other from the Sierra Leone

border to the Liberian coast--roads that happened to link the Firestone plantations. Moreover, the labor for building these roads was conscripted and included BWI students and other natives from nearby tribes.(11)

Nor did the crusaders for industrial schooling show compassion for the problems of the native workers. Jackson Davis took glib notice of the situation during his visit to Liberia. He reported back to the NYSCS that the Africans "work a month on the road in lieu of paying taxes. Some may say this is forced labor, but I see nothing to get excited about. It is the African pay-as-you-go plan."(12)

Whatever name one gave to the conscripting of labor in Liberia, most natives felt bitter resentment toward the practice. The road building activity led to an atmosphere of mistrust between BWI students and the Institute. Some felt that the Institute betrayed them by supporting conscription and not using its influence at least to have them excused from working on the road project. The discontent, which continued beyond the 1935 road project, apparently manifested itself in numerous ways. It was reported that students were taking their lessons less seriously, that many were dropping from the institution, and that school property was being destroyed or stolen. Many local natives had never been convinced that the foreigner's school had their best interest at heart; to them it was a place to be despised, "a place to rob and steal all you can get."(13)

The continued drop in BWI's holding power after 1936 led to a major conference of the crusaders for industrial education. On December 5, 1938, Thomas

Jesse Jones called for a meeting to be held on the 13th of that month, with representatives of the various boards and of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. The decision of the Meeting was to recall Paul Rupel and install a new principal at BWI. Representatives at the meeting believed that a change in leadership would solve the problems surrounding the school.(14)

Change of leadership of BWI did not bring an end to the problem. The new principal was Claude M. Rupel, brother of the school's former principal. Like his brother Claude believed that the essential task was to make the students work, not at mathematics, writing, history, science, or other such academic luxuries but with the hands in the traditions of industrial education as exemplified at Tuskegee and Hampton Institutes in the United States. There were one hundred young men enrolled at BWI when Claude Rupel succeeded his brother at head of the Institute in 1939. The complaints about the operation as the school continued. As they previously had informed Paul Rupel, officials of the Liberian Department of Public Instruction advised Claude Rupel of complaints from students about the overstress upon work at the expense of academic studies. However, the established focus on manual workers and not academics persisted, as indicated in a 1939 letter from Lester A. Walton, the black United States Minister of Liberia, who noted that because of this policy, "the boys, in order to be accepted, must be of a comparatively advanced age. "(15)

Claude Rupel's was a reactionary principalship. He spent much of his time answering charges and defending his administrative decisions. Lester Walton

was only one of the many who criticized what was going on at BWI. Liberia was undergoing a transformation that neither Claude Rupel nor the supporters of the Institute in New York recognized or understood: it was experiencing an emergent nationalism and native consciousness. In the 1930's the natives, led by men like Didwo Twe, had begun to agitate for greater representation and more opportunity. The rule of Charles Dunbar Burgess King, who in 1929 welcomed BWI, was ousted by reform advocates led by Edwin Barclay in 1930. Barclay was suspicious of BWI for its connection with his predecessor and antagonistic to the educational purposes of the Institute. The new tide of nationalism and the pressures from the natives for a different form of schooling won out.

Barclay was opposed to BWI's leadership, which was all white. Ex-president King expressed similar views. When King visited Tuskegee Institute in America in the late 1920's, he was so favorably impressed with the work there that he agreed readily to cooperate in the development of a "small Tuskegee" in Liberia. King's "friendly attitude" was based on the impression that the Board of Management would send to Liberia a "negro educator of high standing" to serve as principal of the school. President Barclay similarly expressed himself as to the kind of principal he had expected.(16)

The Liberian Government was suspicious of the Institute. Class lines were clearly drawn in Liberia with the fifteen thousand Americo-Liberians holding the major positions of power. BWI catered to educating the native masses but was not under Liberian control. Thus the school was suspect to the Americos. Adding to the complexity was the Liberian Government's attempt in

1938 to wrestle away some of the Firestone plantations' economic hold over the nation. The government initiated competing banks, trading stores, and other market outlets. But they quickly learned that they did not possess the power to buck the Firestone organization and gave up the attempt. The incident left deep scars on both sides. The Americo-Liberians' suspicion of anything foreign deepened. This attitude reflected on the relationship between the Government of Liberia and BWI. President Barclay proclaimed in 1939: "I will not set foot on Booker Washington Institute as long as I live."(17)

Another contributing factor to the difficulties was the pamphlet, "The Liberian Crisis," published by Henry L. West, President of the Board of Trustees of BWI and head of the American Colonization Society. West's article criticized the Americo-led Liberian government and the rate of progress in the nation. Hence, there were a multiplicity of ill feelings surrounding BWI and Claude Rupel's principalship of the institution. Rupel blamed the problems that the school and he faced on one factor--race. "The real reason at the bottom of the whole thing--racial," he wrote in defense of his administration to Anson Phelps Stokes. "President Barclay is very much anti-American and anti-white."(18)

President Barclay was not a leading force against Claude Rupel. He had neither the time nor the energy to devote to a campaign against him. Barclay simply kept distance between himself and BWI's administration. When invited to attend functions at the Institute, he always found his schedule too full to attend. The major challenge to Claude Rupel's leadersip of BWI,

from 1939 to the termination of his principalship in 1941, came from within the institution. BWI students were at constant odds with Rupel. On June 7, 1939, students filed an official complaint with J. B. Watson, the Liberian commissioner of education for the Kakata district. Twenty-nine of BWI's one hundred students signed the complaint. Their grievances struck at the very heart of the institution--its work ethic. "I do say that the Principal and his Staff of Teachers have no interest in us as the student [sic] of this Institute," Thomas K. Anderson charged in the official list of complaints against Rupel:

> because when a student is on his sick bed, he receives no benefits from the Institute; and all of the labourers here on the Institute have [sic] been stopped [sic] from working, and we are forced to do all manual labour. The Principal have [sic] forced other unlawful and unreasonable measures upon us.

Another of the students, Hillary Dennis, complained that

> the Principal of this Institute have [sic] really taken advantage of us as student [sic] of this Institute; from the very fact that we have to bear our own incidental expenses; and we are not given any consideration of any work which is done by us in access [sic] beyond what is lay [sic] down in keeping with Regulation [sic] of this Institute.

Several students complained that they were forced to become street vendors for Booker Washington Institute, selling goods and merchandise in Monrovia for the school. "Marketable products should be sold within school hours and not otherwise," lamented Joseph

Nimley, another of the student complainants.(19)

The foundation of the industrial schooling idea rested upon the premise that people of color were a natural labor source, extremely valuable if used efficiently. The crux of industrial training was not to prepare African-Americans or their African brethren as artisans. Rather, the concern was to instill certain values and beliefs in the blacks. The shared goal in both the American and Liberian context was the maintenance of Western leadership and superiority. For Claude Rupel, and BWI, the mission was supposed to be one of pacification; ingrain the school into the very life blood of Liberia; make the people dependent on the institution and American know-how. Rupel approached the project a bit too zealously. The delicate nature of Liberian political sensitivities, the class structure, and the nationalist posture of the nation, were complexities and nuances unfamiliar to Rupel and the crusaders for industrial education back in the United States. Claude Rupel simply went about the task at BWI in the only way he knew, with one-track perseverance, unyielding demands, racial arrogance, and callousness toward the physical welfare of his students. After all, in his mind, the students were mere workers whose future was to serve and toil in a white-ruled world.

Principal Rupel was unsympathetic to the needs of his students. The conditions under which they were required to perform their tasks were unbearable. Students rebelled against the conditions and against Rupel's leadership. They thought it only fair that given the amount of work they performed they should receive a decent diet. "The rice which we have been

eating formerly being bad, we made him, the Chief Principal of this Institute, to understand he should have the rice better prepared; which he failed to do," said student Joseph Nimley. Many of the students went hungry, explained Hillary Dennis. He believed that Rupel did not care; all he wanted was for the students to work on the Firestone plantations and to work at BWI making brick, clearing roads, constructing the new buildings, and planting and harvesting the school's crops. Another student, Samuel B. Campbell, complained that Rupel and BWI were starving them while robbing them of the money due for their work on the Firestone plantations, at BWI, and elsewhere. "We are not given good food to nourish our bodies," Campbell stated, "and we are forced by the Principal of this Institute to do manual labour in the face of this fact. We are made to understand that we are doing the said manual labour for money but we never see any of it."(20)

Liberia was a difficult environment for whites unaccustomed to dealing with blacks in positions of authority. This was extremely difficult for Claude Rupel, who was often baffled by the complaints of the students and the fact that Liberian officials challenged his authority and demanded that he be respectful and accountable to them. To Claude Rupel, Liberia was a land of arrogant negroes who did not know their proper place. His wife felt the same way. The complaints filed by the students with the District Commissioner of Education so frustrated the Rupels that they called upon Lester A. Walton, United States Minister to Liberia, to intercede on their behalf and in their defense. In the Rupels' meeting with Walton, they literally demanded that he take action against their accusers. Walton, a black American, would have

none of it. As he put it: "I will not take sides." Marie Rupel, Claude Rupel's wife, was furious that a black American would dare take such a stand, especially one who served as an American representative in Liberia. Marie Rupel's estimate of blacks was based on her American background. Liberia was a different matter; it was a black man's land and its power and majesty rubbed off on its black visitors such as Walton. Moreover, as Walton explained to Mr. and Mrs. Rupel, they were visitors in Liberia and would have to understand that. In addition, as he informed them, BWI was a suspect institution to the Liberian government and many of the nation's citizens. Being quite frank, Walton told the Rupels that he too had little faith in BWI. He questioned the rightness of an educational program that simply made its students do manual work.

Marie Rupel, in a letter to Thomas Jesse Jones, complained about their meeting with Walton and his statements regarding BWI. "Dr. Jones, since we came to Liberia we have been through a very great deal, hell fire of a good many kinds," Marie Rupel wrote. The worst experience, in her mind, was their meeting with Walton. She was convinced that Walton blamed Claude Rupel and Paul Rupel for the difficulties surrounding BWI. During the meeting, Walton had expressed his discontent with the racial atmosphere at the school. Although it is difficult to believe that he shouted these convictions at the Rupels during the meeting, Marie Rupel claimed that he did, and that his entire tone and manner was offensive and disrespectful. What probably upset Mrs. Rupel was that Walton spoke his own mind. He was not the type of man who let the truth go unheeded. When Marie Rupel, who had no knowledge of either the historical, political, or economic

dimensions of BWI, challenged Walton's position regarding the school, he informed her of her ignorance. Walton told Mrs. Rupel that BWI was supplying cheap labor to the Firestone Plantations Company and that the school's mission was to guard and foster American self-interests in Liberia. He noted that just a few days earlier, Henry S. Villard of the United States Department of State met with him and attempted to "pressure" him to aid the Rupels in their defense against the charges made by the disgruntled students. Walton was convinced that Claude Rupel and the powerful forces in New York who were behind BWI had charged Villard to express these views, and he told his convictions to the Rupels. Marie Rupel suggested to her husband Claude that they leave the meeting, to which Walton told them to sit down. He had more to say, and continued his oratory on BWI. "It was insulting in the extreme," Marie Rupel wrote in her letter to Jones.

> He (Walton) ranted, yelled and went through all kinds of contortions, took the words we had spoken, twisted, turned and miscontrued them. The way he lit into me was a sin against civilization. He told Claude that what he said was not true. He shouted that after Mr. Villard was here he got word to look out for American interests, and he knew just where that came from. Dr. Jones, I never knew that a mature grown man could be so small as Mr. Walton showed himself to be, during that hour.

She described him as "everlastingly arrogant" and unfit for his position. Mrs. Rupel also intimated to Jones that there were other Americans in Liberia who were equally disappointed in the way Walton discharged his

duties as United States Minister to Liberia.(21)

The industrial crusaders in America took the matter up in earnest. They were unconcerned that the Liberian government and many natives resented the Institute and its administrative leadership. Rather, they critized Rupel for letting things get out of control. Next, the NYSCS applied more pressure to the American legation in Liberia. Walton received a letter from Jones asking that he intervene in the Rupel matter, and reminding him that he was one of their friends and "now is the time for friends to be counted." Walton expected such a letter and responded freely about the attempts at pressuring him. "Last October I was very much hurt when Mr. Villard brought me a nebulous message advising me 'to look after American interests,'" Walton replied to Jones. "I characterize the message as nebulous for he failed to reveal the identity of senders." Walton stated that if the message came from any officials in Washington, "please say for me I could not be more conscientious with respect to looking after American interests and I was prepared to tender my resignation immediately if my policy was not regarded satisfactory." Villard had promptly assured Walton that the Department of State appreciated his work and that no complaint had been made from that source. Hence, Walton could come to no other conclusion, as he put it to Jones, "than that the piece of advice came from some of my friends directly interested in the prosecution of educational and missionary interests in Liberia." Walton noted that it had been said that President Barclay and he thought very much alike. They did on some matters, especially that of black autonomy. But, in the final analysis Barclay had the Liberian point of view and Walton the

American point of view. He pointed out also that President Barclay had on one occasion told him that he liked his interpretation of the Liberian position, to which Walton responded that his first duty was "to faithfully interpret the American point of view to the Liberian Government."(22)

Walton's job was extremely difficult. First, he was an honest and forthright individual. Second, he was a proud black man who felt a deep sense of cameraderie toward the Liberian nation. He thought of himself as an African-American who had a duty to his people both in America and in the continent of Africa. At the same time, he was an American who believed in the rightness of his land and government. And he was a professional. As Minister to Liberia, Walton tackled his job with dedication and earnestness. Yet, he had no faith in the American-sponsored program of industrial education for Liberia. Walton was not an industrial man. He received his education in the United States at predominantly black colleges that were oriented towards the liberal arts. Moreover, he could not hide his belief that educating a people solely to work with their hands was wrong. He understood the outlook of the crusaders for industrial education and he was sensitive to Liberian nationalism and its shortcomings. "It is a nerve-racking job trying as I am to conciliate various elements, conflicting psychologies and ideologies," he confided to Jones. He had to state in all frankness that he opposed the mission of BWI and disapproved of the way Claude Rupel ran the Institution. Walton did not favor the Liberian class-caste structure but agreed with Barclay that, at least, BWI should be headed by a black man. "To you it is no secret that I agree with President Barclay as to

the type of man who should be Principal of Booker Washington Institute," he told Jesse Jones. "We have often discussed the subject."(23)

The students' challenge of Claude Rupel continued. They were convinced that Rupel was an enemy. As far as they were concerned, he had shown it in many ways, including whipping students to make them obedient. They discussed among themselves the logic or mislogic of a white man being the only person "qualified" to be principal of the school--a remark often made by the American friends of the Rupels. Then the students took their complaints about Rupel to the District Commissioner of Education.

They also lashed out at the other members of BWI's faculty, including the school's two black faculty members. Teacher Lois Pittman, an Americo-Liberian, received their bitter denunciation. Several students had approached Miss Pittman earlier in the year and asked her support in fighting for changes at the school, especially the way Rupel treated the students. Pittmann sided with the principal. Hillary Dennis thought Pittman lacked "blackness". "You are a black woman and should have sympathy," he told her. She asked Dennis his reason "for stressing the difference in color so much." The students said that Liberia was their country, and that they expected fair treatment and questioned the right of a foreign white man from America to rule them. But this line of nationalist argument failed to generate a positive response from Pittman. This angered Dennis who was beginning to see her as an anti-nationalist, an Americo who thought herself superior to her native students. He gave the teacher a stern warning: "God heard that the rope in

the bush is a very long one and some day you may meet it. Tomorrow is a new moon and your place may be vacant."(24)

That Pittman sided with Rupel was to be expected. The staff of BWI projected a negative image of black self. The principals of BWI and the predominantly white faculty had for many years made derogatory remarks about Liberia and its leaders. In their minds, foreign was best, and American the superior of all. Black members of the faculty shared this view. Pittmann readily accepted her unequal faculty status. As she told Dennis and his friends: "You should not have come to me. I cannot help you. I am the foot and the head has spoken. The foot cannot speak because the foot has no mouth. The head has a mouth and had spoken. Whoever heard of feet speaking?" In short, Claude Rupel's word was the only word of authority, and she would not challenge his decision.(25)

To challenge his authority was to invite retribution. The students were correct in their allegation that Principal Rupel was unfair. The principal kept a close eye on the students who filed the complaint against him, despite the Liberian government's mandate that there be no administrative repercussions at BWI against the students for their action. Samuel Campbell believed that Rupel watched him more closely after the episode, and that he was treated worse because of his protest. "I worked on a job for Mr. Rupel," he said, "and I was to get five shillings for the work, and Mr. Rupel only gave me one shilling." When the three students who orchestrated the petition movement were expelled in late 1939, Dennis charged that Rupel did it to get revenge: "It

was because of the action we took a little while back that we are now being expelled." Samuel Campbell was so angry and disgusted with the principal he suggested that one solution might be "to shoot Rupel and bury him."(26)

Liberian nationalism and the BWI ideology were a combustible mixture. For Principal Rupel the continuous talk of black consciousness and cultural nationalism was meaningless. Nevertheless, both forces were at work on the campus of BWI. The students made mental notes of Rupel's hostile attitude to Liberian nationalism. They reported that the principal characterized the Liberians, Americo and native alike, as backward savages. On August 7, 1939, a group of BWI students filed a second petition of complaint against Rupel with the District Commissioner of Education, J. B. Watson. The students had approached Rupel earlier in the week to ask that a variety of changes be made at the school. When he denied their request, they threatened to go forward with their petition and complain to President Barclay. "Mr. Rupel then said that Mr. Barclay the President of Liberia did not bring him to this Country hence he had nothing to do with him," one of the students claimed in the petition. A second petitioner cited another example: "Our daily meals being badly prepared, we applied to the principal Mr. Rupel who said that the Official of Government in Liberia isn't eating good food what sort of good food you want? Such insinuation has been made by Mr. Rupel and is still being made." They accused Marie Rupel of similar conduct. Mrs. Rupel "had the mind to tell us that the salary paid to the President of Liberia is too much for a small country, since he is only ruling one state," the petitioners charged.(27)

The most damaging statement that the students made in their complaint concerned the political nature of BWI. They described the institution as opposed to Liberian nationalism and black leadership. Moreover, they suggested that clandestine operations geared to enhance American control over Liberia were carried on at the school. The students did not elaborate as to the nature of the alleged covert operations at BWI. They simply reported that Lois Pittman, the female member of the teaching staff, inadvertently told them that the Booker Washington Institute of Liberia was an "American Secret School."(28)

Claude Rupel's reactions to the complaints seemed to support the students' contention that he believed himself above Liberian authority. Rupel ignored the request of Commissioner Watson that he report to his office to answer the charges of the students. "I regret to observe your failure to come to my call when you were informed of the assignment of the investigation between yourself and some of the student body," Watson wrote to the principal. "The investigation should have been held today at the hour of three o'clock, p.m., for which you were duly notified. I have, however, postponed the said investigation until tomorrow at the hour of t- o'clock." The commissioner made it clear that he expected Rupel to be present and that if he failed to appear at the hearing, his office would be "compelled to take up the matter of your action with his Excellency the President of Liberia."(29)

Rupel wrote an immediate response, denying all charges. He explained that he had never said anything

against the Liberian government. "I have had no reason to inform these...boys about the food which the Government officials eat, as I have never seen their food. Consequently, I have never mentioned it to them. I do not know what these boys mean by the expression, 'such insinuation . . . is still being made.'" Claude Rupel was at a loss to understand the full gravity of the charges against him. However, he knew that further publicity of this nature would not serve the interests of BWI, or his administrative future. The possibility that the matter might be brought to the attention of the president of Liberia was a matter of great and immediate concern. "I should regret your taking up with His Excellency the President, a matter of which I know nothing," Rupel informed Watson.(30)

BWI instructors took a defensive posture. Teachers at the Institute wrote to Commissioner Watson, denying the students' accusations against them and the principal. Edwin Lawrence, one of the BWI teachers who was on good terms with the students, thought that the petitioners' accusations were "somewhat exaggerated." Lois Pittman called the students' allegations "untrue, and made in a spirit of revenge, and for the purpose of embarrassing and damaging" her. She characterized the young men in questions as troublemakers who were protesting because they had been disciplined for their ill behavior. Pittman lashed out at the students' claim that she told them that undercover activities were taking place at BWI. "In the first place, I do not know what an American Secret School is, never having heard of such a school, therefore I could not say a thing of which I have no knowledge." The teacher struck a note of patriotism: "As a loyal Liberian citizen," she concluded in her letter to Watson, "I

have said nothing against the Government of Liberia to these boys, but have ever pointed them to obedience to her laws and taught them to respect our Country."(31)

The situation could not be defused. Realizing this, Claude Rupel, his wife, and the BWI teaching staff, retained the services of P. Gbe Wolo, attorney at law. Rupel felt that the issue had gotten out of hand and that it would be wise to have professional legal help. The choosing of Wolo as counsel was a wise move legally if not politically. Wolo was a native Liberian who had received his legal training in the United States at Yale University. He supported Booker Washington Institute and believed that industrial schooling was the salvation for the Liberian masses. Gbe Wolo, however, exerted little or no influence with the ruling Americo-Liberians. His support of BWI during this particular time did nothing to aid his career and future. Moreover, Wolo's appointment as counsel for the Rupels incensed Liberian officials, Americo and native. Commissioner Watson interpreted the Rupels' retention of legal counsel as an indication that there was something to hide. In addition, Wolo aggravated the commissioner when, in arguing for the dismissal of the charges against the principal and his wife, he intimated that Watson might be prejudiced against the school. Indeed, the students in their charges against the Institute alleged that Claude Rupel spoke negatively about numerous Liberian officials, including Commissioner Watson. The argument by Wolo particulary offensive to Watson was the following:

> Mr. Commissioner, I want this to be taken down as I speak. Those members of the Faculty of Booker

> Washington Institute accused by the expelled boys, with having made statements against the Government of Liberia, His Excellency the President, and Commissioner J. B. Watson, and who have by writing submitted their denials of those purported statements against the Government and the parties mentioned, refuse and object to the Commissioner going further into these proceedings for the reason that the said Commissioner is one of the parties against whom it is alleged these derogatory statements have been made, and who therefore by law, cannot hear this case, that is, sit in judgment in his own case.

Watson's patience was gone. He had taken enough of what he perceived as an attitude of extreme arrogance on the part of BWI Principal and Mrs. Rupel, the accused teachers, and their counsel. The commissioner referred the entire matter to President Barclay.(32)

Barclay's reaction was immediate and critical of the Institute and its leadership. In the matter of the students' complaints, the President suggested to Watson that it would have been more proper for the students to take the issue "not in the first instance to the Administrator of the District, but to the Board of Trustees of the Institute, to whom it would seem as is usual, the Principal is responsible." The President was less diplomatically minded in dealing with Gbe Wolo's contention that Watson disqualify himself from the proceedings because his name was mentioned in the complaint. This was nonsense, Barclay said, and "is not a legitimate ground upon which to object to your discharging duties legally entrused to you . . . As to the view that you would be investigating your own case

this is also without foundation. You are not a Party to the complaint. Wherein, then, is it your own case?" The crux of the problem, as Barclay saw it, rested in the racial attitude of BWI. He wrote to Commissioner Watson and sent a copy of the letter to the American Embassy in Liberia:

> It is a matter of record in this Office that the Institute BWI has since 1931 been a hot-bed of disloyalty to my Government. It is also known that derogatory statements about the Country and about Negros are constantly being made by the White people who are in charge there. It is also known that the Liberian and other Negro employees are discriminated against in favour of whites both in respect of pay and living conditions at the Institute. These reports have been made over a period of years. I have, however, taken no action on them because I feel everyone has a right to his opinions and might act upon those opinions without molestation, provided no overt act detrimental to the interests of the State is attempted.(33)

Although Barclay and BWI enjoyed a working relationship, especially in regard to the Firestone Plantations and various road-building projects, this did not deter him from criticizing the Institute in the name of black nationalism. There was, to be sure, a striking contradiction in what the advocates of BWI said the institution stood for and the image the school projected. A white principal with an arrogant personality was more than Liberian nationalism or President Edwin Barclay could stand. Booker T. Washington, the man after whom BWI was named, had been

the principal of an all-black school, Tuskegee Institute, and he himself was black. There were many problems with the Tuskegee order of things that stemmed from the very nature of the industrial schooling idea. One fact was certain, however: the industrial schooling experiment, as tried at Tuskegee, placed blacks in charge of the administration and the instruction of the students. In this sense, BWI was a poor mirror of its American counterpart. That the chief administrator of BWI be black was a point on which Liberians, Americo and native, agreed.(34)

BWI's trustees did not. They felt no compulsion to bow to the rhetoric of black nationalism. Thomas Jones labelled President Barclay's attitude toward the school as "foolish consciousness pushed forward by an anti-white sentiment." Jones believed that the problem would never have arisen if American friends in Liberia did their part. He was most upset with Walton. "It is further my conviction that our American Minister had consciously or unconsciously encouraged the [Liberian] President in this whimsical but really dangerous attitude. At any rate he has failed to exert the helpful influence expected of a fellow American and certainly of the American Minister," Jones remarked. The industrial education crusaders conjectured that a wise step toward easing the problems surrounding BWI was to remove Walton. Claude Rupel had hoped for as much. He and his wife subtley and, on several occasions, quite pointedly suggested to the school's backers that they pressure Walton to change his attitude or that they seek to have him replaced as American minister to Liberia. The forces in New York also entertained one other step--replacing Claude Rupel as principal of BWI.(35)

The American crusaders for black industrial education were unwilling to comply with the symbolic demands of Liberian nationalism. They believed that what was required was to appoint the right man to head the school, a white man well experienced in and capable of dealing with the peculiar working of the African mind.(36) The crusaders' world view and their African vision were premised on black subordination to white, and it would take a great deal more Liberian agitation to change that perspective.

The agitation continued, but it was the coming of World War II that brought change. The heightened importance of Liberian rubber to the United States as a result of war needs, necessitated a move toward conciliation on the part of the American supporters of industrial education. They became willing to compromise on BWI, because they saw the school as an aid to the interests of the United States in Liberia and a potential symbol of American goodwill. By the end of the war, the Booker Washington Institute had its first black principal, Walter C. Wynn. In January of 1954, the control of the Institute was turned over to the Liberians.

NOTES

1 James L. Sibley, **Education and Missions in Liberia** (New York: Phelps-Stokes Fund, 1926), p. 23; see also Donald Spivey, "The African Crusade for Black Industrial Schooling," **Journal of Negro History**, (January 1978): 1-17, and **Schooling for the New Slavery: Black Industrial Education, 1868-1915** (Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press, 1978), pp. 109-134.

2 "Report on Educational Needs and Opportunities in Liberia," n. d., p. 2, International Education Board Collection, File No. 290, Rockefeller Archives, Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute of Liberia.

3 Paul W. Rupel to Thomas Jesse Jones, 26 September 1935, Ibid., p. 2.

4 Ibid., p. 3.

5 Ibid., p. 5; Memorandum from Thomas Jesse Jones to Jackson Davis, 26 March 1936, International Education Board Collection, File No. 290, Booker Washington Argricultural and Industrial Institute of Liberia; Rupel to Jones, 26 September 1935, Ibid.

6 Jackson Davis to Thomas Jesse Jones, 15 April 1935, pp. 1-7; see also I. K. Sundiata, **Black Scandal: America and the Liberian Labor Crisis, 1936-1939** (Philadelphia: Institute for

the Study of Human Issues, 1980), pp. 88, 95-97.

7 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute of Liberia, 22 May 1936, p. 4; Memorandum from Thomas Jesse Jones to Jackson Davis, 26 March 1936, p. 3, International Education Board Collection, File No. 290, Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute of Liberia.

8 Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute of Liberia, 22 May 1936, pp. 1-2.

9 "Report on Educational Needs and Opportunities in Liberia," pp. 4, 8; International Education Board Collection File No. 290, Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute of Liberia; Thomas Jesse Jones to Harvey S. Firestone, Jr., 5 December 1938, Ibid., pp. 1-2.

10 Thomas Jesse Jones, "Liberia and the League of Nations," address at the League of Nations Association Convention, St. Louis, Missouri, 13 January 1933, p. 3; "Report on Educational Needs and Opportunities in Liberia," p. 1; International Education Board Collection File No. 290, Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute of Liberia; "Impressions of Liberia--March 31 - April 12, 1935," p. 1 confidential memo to members of the New York State Colonization Society, International Education Board Collection, File No. 290, Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute of Liberia.

11 Ibid., p. 2.

12 Ibid.

13 Paul W. Rupel to Thomas Jesse Jones, 26 September 1935, Ibid., p. 5; for further discussion of the abuses of native labor see Sundiata, **Black Scandal**.

14 Jones to Firestone, 5 December 1938, International Education Board Collection, File No. 290, Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute of Liberia; Minutes of the Meeting of the NYSCS, 13 December 1938, New York State Colonization Society Collection, Box No. 6, Phelps-Stokes Fund Archives, New York.

15 Confidential letter of Lester A. Walton to Secretary of State, U.S.A., 7 January 1939, Box 3, File 24, Claude M. Rupel Papers, Phelps-Stokes Fund Archives, New York.

16 Confidential letter of Wallace Murray, Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, United States Department of State, to Thomas Jesse Jones, Educational Director, Phelps-Stokes Fund, 8 September 1939, p. 2, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

17 Claude Rupel to Anson Phelps Stokes, 11 January 1939, p. 2, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

18 Ibid.

19 Students' Petition Againt Principal Claude Rupel,

7 June 1939, p. 2, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

20 Ibid., pp. 2-3.

21 Marie Rupel and Claude Rupel to Thomas Jesse Jones, 31 July 1939, pp. 1-2, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

22 Lester A. Walton to Thomas Jesse Jones, 25 August 1939, p. 1, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

23 Ibid., pp. 1-4.

24 Memo of Lois Pittman to Claude Rupel, 31 July 1939, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Complaints of BWI Students against Principal Claude Rupel, 7 August 1939, p. 1, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

28 Ibid.

29 J. B. Watson to Claude M. Rupel, 7 August 1939 and 8 August 1939, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

30 Claude M. Rupel to J. B. Watson, 8 August 1939 and 10 August 1939, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

31 Edwin Lawrence to J. B. Watson, 10 August 1939, and Lois Pittman to J. B. Watson, 10 August 1939, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

32 Statement of Counsellor Gbe Wolo before Commissioner J. B. Watson, "In the Matter of Purported Charges Brought by Expelled Students of Booker Washington Institute Against Mr. Claude M. Rupel, Mrs. Claude M. Rupel, Mr. J. E. Lawrence, and Mrs. Lois Pittman," 11 August 1939, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

33 Edwin Barclay to American Department of State, 15 August 1939, p. 2, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

34 Wallace Murray to Thomas Jesse Jones, 6 September 1939, pp. 2-3, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

35 Thomas Jesse Jones to Henry S. Villard, Confidential 8 September 1939; John Harvey Furbay to Thomas Jesse Jones, 3 October 1939; and Henry L. West to Thomas Jesse Jones, 17 October 1939, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

36 See Henry L. West to Thomas Jesse Jones, 17 October 1939, Claude M. Rupel Papers.

Curriculum and Enrollments: Some Thoughts on Assessing the Popularity of Antebellum Colleges

David B. Potts

Two frequent themes in histories of early nineteenth-century higher education have been the impracticality and unpopularity of antebellum colleges. When measured against the hopes of reformers such as George Ticknor or Francis Wayland, these colleges are found to be too limited in their curricula; when measured against what reformers and/or historians determine to be the educational needs of antebellum society, they are found to be islands of institutional elitism amidst a rising tide of democratic sentiment. It is then concluded that, as they failed to respond to these needs and rejected the pleas of reformers, antebellum colleges must have become increasingly unpopular institutions.

Evidence to support the themes of impracticality and unpopularity is typically drawn from documents written by contemporary collegiate reformers and from observations made by late nineteenth century university reformers such as Charles Kendall Adams and Andrew D. White. Given the problems of allowing for biases that might shape perceptions from such sources, it is encouraging to find that the most recent versions of

the century-old interpretation reach out to the new area of student demography(1) for hard data to support the theme of antebellum colleges being out of touch with their times. What better way to measure popularity than at the gate? We currently face an era of enrollment declines and public skepticism about the benefits of higher education, especially liberal arts education. What more appropriate time could exist for historians to find a connection between discouraging enrollment statistics and popular disfavor? And since some of the nineteenth-century reformers have already collected and used enrollment data to buttress their criticism of the classical curriculum in antebellum colleges, there seems little risk that more recently collected data will weaken the case against these institutions.

The early results of integrating student statistics with the established general interpretation, however, are much more unsettling than might be anticipated. Careful scrutiny of the evidence from student studies suggests severe limitations to what enrollment data may tell us about the practicality and popularity of colleges during the antebellum period. Moreover, to the degree that enrollment data indicates anything about public favor or disfavor toward colleges, it suggests a slow but steady increase in popularity from 1800 to 1860. We seem, then, to be at a point where, on the one hand, there is reason to question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the established interpretation, while on the other hand more recently assembled data suggests the possibility of standing that interpretation on its head.(2)

This situation has been apparent for about a

decade. One might, therefore, expect the more recent general works referring to nineteenth-century colleges to express a certain amount of questioning or tentativeness, if not revision. Such a stance is found in a few works. But in too many other cases the established interpretation is reiterated with increased and unwarranted confidence.(3) One work, Frederick Rudolph's **Curriculum: A History of the Undergraduate Course of Study Since 1636**, can be used to illustrate the weaknesses of the established interpretation and the hazards of accepting its more recent versions.

Anyone attempting to write an interesting and coherent history of the undergraduate curriculum in the United States deserves our sympathy as well as our gratitude. Rudolph professes to "have enjoyed trying to give shape and focus to a subject and a concept that are fundamentally so elusive"(4). After reading his labored and confusing discussion of "frames of reference" in the first chapter, one wonders if the preface, containing his statement about the pleasurable nature of his scholarly task, might have been written with a Swiftian pen. One possible source of enjoyment for Rudolph, however, is suggested in the opening paragraph of the first chapter. Comparing his topic with other historical investigations that might be more easily identified as being colorful, and resisting "a puckish inspiration" to entitle the book **The Harvard-Yale Game and Other Major Rivalries**, Rudolph observes that the curriculum has been "an arena" for interesting and important interactions between society and higher education. The arena analogy suggests that even in curriculum development, perhaps especially in curriculum development, there

might be the elements of high drama and entertainment.

Only when the colonial period has been presented through a sound summary of most recent scholarship does Rudolph's story become emotionally charged. In contrast to the theme of "gradual and subtle" improvements prior to 1800, "a reactionary mood...set in among College governors and others during the first decade of the nineteenth century." Chapter Three begins with the Columbia trustees of 1830 in a state of "panic and pandering" because of declining enrollments and the competitive threat of the University of the City of New York. The perspective quickly expands to a national context where "egalitarian impulses challenged the essentially elitist pretensions of the colleges." For the next fifty pages or so the text is liberally salted with highly charged language. Colleges, faced with an "alarming bundle of movements and tendencies that undermined the traditional prestige of classical learning," then "stumbled around in search of some secure identity" and "sometimes behaved quite as bizarrely as the trustees of Columbia College." College founders engaged in a "rash of overbuilding." Science teaching was expanded and modern languages introduced, but "not...without great struggle and bitterness." Reactionary faculty "sabotaged reforms." By the 1850s, "colleges geared to the needs of village elites to flaunt their Latin and Greek," are "plagued by unpopularity" and are experiencing a period of "crisis." They must "be practical or perish."(5) As in Greek tragedy, a large and explicit theme of inevitability is woven through the entire drama.

Those familiar with Rudolph's earlier work, with Hofstadter's portrayal of the "great retrogression,"

and with other studies in the same vein will find the story familiar, although perhaps stated in its most strident rendition.(6) In showing the ways that it increasingly intersects with student enrollment statistics recently collected or scrutinized, let us look at each of the four principal players cited by Rudolph and most other historians staging this saga of early nineteenth-century higher education. In order of appearance, this cast of characters includes the Yale **Report** of 1828; a hardy band of thwarted reformers at Harvard, Amherst, and a few other institutions; Eliphalet Nott, president of Union Collge from 1804 to 1866; and Francis Wayland, president of Brown University from 1827 to 1855.

The Yale **Report** of 1828 occupies its accustomed role as witting or unwitting villain of the piece. For Rudolph the portrayal has always been one of an unwitting villain, but his analysis of the dramatic role has become more detailed over the years.

Rudolph finds much to praise in the **Report**. Almost twenty years ago he lauded this document as "a magnificent assertion of the humanist tradition and therefore of unquestionable importance in liberating the American college from an excessive religious orientation."(7) In his current book, a lengthy and sympathetic summary of the **Report** emphasizes that the Yale faculty had constructed not only a defense of the classics but also a "plea for quality" that was "widely read and just as widely needed."(8) It is strongly implied that such an effort to engage human wisdom in the service of a bustling young nation was greatly needed.

Yet Rudolph's final assessment is based on inadequacies of the **Report** which render this document "a kind of last gesture, a summoning of energy and purity and clarity of purpose appropriate to a tribe on the edge of extinction." The villainous plot unwittingly aided and abetted by the **Report** rests on the connection, Rudolph asserts, between faculty psychology and its use of local reactionaries to justify a low-cost curriculum serving elitist purposes. Thus the Yale **Report** delivered to those who used authority, traditions, and institutions to hold man in "moral and intellectual...slavery" all they needed in the way of "a veneer of educational philosophy." For one such reactionary, a trustee at the College of California in the 1860s, the Yale reputation as enhanced by this document "subsidized his swagger." As a document whose inadequacies produced unintended consequences, the **Report** is therefore viewed as an impediment to progress. But Rudolph's detailed and multi-faceted discussion of the **Report** is also in part a lament. He concludes with the almost wistful comment: "It was not enough."(9)

What evidence is offered to support this somewhat reluctant criticism? Acknowledging that faculty psychology was "the conventional wisdom of its time," Rudolph moves to more advantageous ground by using the present to measure the past. If confronted with **Report's** model of how the mind develops and operates, "a twentieth-century psychologist would be appalled." From this point forward, the book employs a sharp contrast between outmoded faculty psychology and "the psychology of individual differences and interests."(10) Overlooked in this contrast (and in Rudolph's footnote references) is the monograph by

Walter B. Kolesnik tracing the many historical stages of thinking about transfer of training, an area in psychology which is far from definitively researched.(11) Rudolph's sweeping dismissal of faculty psychology therefore obscures some complex issues of psychological understanding and historical interpretation. His sources on conservatism and elitism are mostly limited to undocumented and underdocumented observations made by historians whose primary purpose is to explain events occurring in the late nineteenth century and who have a strong interest in establishing a contrast with the preceding half century.(12) These sources, moreover, are used in lieu of the best available research on college students during the antebellum years. David Allmendinger's important monograph, for example, which supplies a great deal of evidence contradicting the thesis of elitism, is neither addressed in the text nor cited in the bibliography.(13)

The greatest weakness in the traditional interpretation of the Yale **Report**, however, is not the absence of data on disbelief in mental discipline among the general public in Jacksonian America or the selective use of secondary sources in asserting that colleges of this era were elitist. The main problem is confronting the fact that Yale College, as measured by enrollments for 1828 and the years beyond, was among the most popular institutions in the country. Rudolph generously acknowledges Yale's prosperity, but makes no attempt to integrate the meaning of this statistic with his subsequent observations that low enrollments at institutions with a basically classical curriculum constitute evidence for their unpopularity. If the relationship between enrollments and a classical

curriculum is an indicator of a college's popularity, it is appropriate to ask whether Yale's enrollments after 1828 reflected public disfavor by declining or at least leveling off. Might this not be particularly expected in a bustling commercial and manufacturing city rather than a small town where Rudolph asserts that a traditional college would be able to perpetuate itself by merely serving a local elite? Unfortunately, for the established view of antebellum colleges, student data shows that Yale's enrollments increased by more than sixty percent between 1828 and 1860.(14)

What about Harvard? Harvard makes its appearance, right after discussion of Yale **Report**, within the context of failed reforms at the University of Nashville, the University of Vermont, the University of the City of New York, the University of Virginia, and Amherst College. Harvard is the most important member of this group, because it is the only institution among them where curriculum reformers were able to institute and sustain for almost a decade a significant alternative to the limited curriculum of Yale. In Nashville, Philip Lindsley's plans for a university that would be both utilitarian and scholarly succumbed to competition from neighboring colleges modeled on the curricular philosophy of the Yale **Report**. James Marsh was unsuccessful in his attempts at Vermont to depart from the Yale plan for reasons which Rudolph does not make clear. The forerunner of New York University made a brief attempt to move in the directon of an earned master's degree but soon lapsed back into the ways of a classical college. Thomas Jefferson's attempts to incorporate certain practices from continental universities into the University of Virginia fell on "indifferent soil." By 1831 the institution he founded

had "capitulated to tradition." At Amherst a faculty pamphlet of 1827 proposed a B. A. curriculum requiring neither Latin nor Greek, "but the institution lacked the will and the means to give it a respectable try."(15)

Harvard made the best effort of anyone in this group. Between 1835 and 1843 faculty reformers were able to enact academic regulations within which "virtually all courses beyond the freshman year were offered on an elective basis." Although the vision of reformers comparable to Lindsley, Marsh, and Jefferson played an important role, Harvard's experience seems especially instructive, because the immediate motivation to change comes less from reformer idealism than from responses to signals sent by the general public.(16) Here is an example with apparently fine potential for reinforcing the traditional view of antebellum higher education.

The evidence offered is both scholarly and statistical. Rudolph cites Robert McCaughey's recent biography of Josiah Quincy. Upon assuming the presidency of Harvard in 1839, Quincy tried to pattern his college after the example of Yale. But Quincy, according to McCaughey, had to face some hard facts about public opinion. "Never had dissatisfaction [with colleges] been more general," and colleges in the 1830s' were "on the defensive." A more specific and telling signal was the enrollment declines of the early 1830s'. Reacting to these disturbing facts, Quincy endeavored to make Harvard more attractive and accessible to prospective students by instituting a primarily elective curriculum.(17)

But what is the evidence offered, in turn, by McCaughey? In addition to referring readers to a chapter in Rudolph's **The American College and University** (detailed analysis of which would overlap in large part with this analysis of Curriculum) McCaughey cites a chapter in Richard J. Storr's **The Beginnings of Graduate Education in America** as a persuasive source for "the general dissatisfaction with American colleges."(18) Storr detects "a general uneasiness over higher education in the United States" and considerable controversy in educational circles during the 1820s and 1830s. It is difficult, however, to find hard evidence of public dissatisfaction in Storr's chapter. We learn that the Yale **Report** expressed concern over the limited resources available for significant changes in American higher education at that stage of its development; that graduate education offered by the new, under-financed, and poorly administered University of the City of New York attracted few students; that Congress decided against using funds from the Smithsonian bequest to found a national university; and that a letter printed in an 1830 issue of the **New York American** supported the Yale **Report** of 1828.(19) Does this add up to "general dissatisfaction" with American colleges?

More persuasive evidence might be found in the complete enrollment statistics in Harvard catalogues for the years 1828-1860. McCaughey supplies totals for two years: 252 students enrolled in 1829-30, Quincy's first year as president, and 210 students in 1834-35, when it became necessary to make "an accommodation" to public opinion.(20) Yet the catalogues tell us that in the fall of 1834, before Quincy instituted reforms,

Harvard admitted by far its largest freshman class in five years. One might also guess that as more course election was permitted enrollments would show some increase. In fact, however, they fluctuate considerably from year to year and do not attain a level consistently higher than the early Quincy years until after what Rudolph describes as a movement back toward increased prescription, beginning around 1843. It would seem, therefore, that the Harvard experience suggests caution in seeking to connect the nature of the antebellum curriculum and changes in enrollment totals.

Yale may falter in educational imagination and Harvard in innovations which boost enrollments, but Union College steps onto the stage as "the best of all possible worlds." Under the clever and charismatic leadership of Eliphalet Nott, Union, according to Rudolph, "believed in young men" and "believed in itself." Nott introduced a parallel scientific course in 1828 that entitled students to the same B.A. degree awarded to those completing the classical course. "Where others failed," Rudolph tells us, "Union flourished." With "about a third of each class...enrolled in the scientific course," Union's enrollment "went merrily up." Throughout the 1830s Union was graduating as many students as its closet rival, Yale.(21)

Evidence for casting Union in this heroic role is primarily drawn from a recent biography of Nott by Codman Hislop. From this source comes the important estimate that one-third of the students were enrolld in the scientific course.(22) Better evidence, it would seem, could scarcely be found concerning public demand

for an attractive curricular alternative to the classical curriculum defended by the Yale Report.

There are several pitfalls, however, in using this data to draw such conclusions. Hislop probably based his undocumented estimate on a perusal of the so-calld Merit Books in the Union archives(23). A look at this source reveals the great difficulty if not impossibility of an accurate count of juniors or seniors enrolled in the scientific course. Nott was operating in the 1830s and 1840s with an unannounced elective system that permitted classical students to take scientific course listings and vice versa. Most students seem to have exercised their freedom of choice. It is very hard to find many students who can be designated purely scientific or purely classical. Blurring of these distinctions in practice may help explain why John Whitehead, in a book published two years after Hislop's biography, gives the undocumented estimate that one-fourth of all Union students were enrolled in the scientific course.(24)

Even if the higher of these estimates is granted, there is reason to ask whether it constitutes evidence for a nonclassical curricular option stimulating significant enrollment increases. In 1820 Union had 255 students. Giving the reforms of 1828 time to have some effect, a look at the statistics for 1850 shows a total of 266 students. For several of the years between these dates the enrollments topped 300, but the annual average between 1834 and 1850 was 278, giving little reason to conclude from the overall statistical picture that liberalizing requirements for the traditional bachelor's degree led to major enrollment gains.(25) Other causal variables may explain Union's

attractiveness as well or better than a new curricular option. The chance to take the senior year moral philosophy course from Nott may have attracted many students. A flourishing system of social fraternities probably proved attractive to others. Finally, there is the question of academic standards. On the eve of implementing Union's new scientific curriculum in 1828, Nott, according to his sympathetic late nineteenth-century biographers, was busy denying charges emanating from some New England educators that his college had become during the 1820s a "Botany Bay" where under-qualified and unruly students denied access to other colleges could find ready refuge. One source of these charges was reported to be a recently departed member of the Union faculty, none other that Francis Wayland, the new president of Brown University. Nott, in a letter to his son-in-law written in September, 1828, found Wayland to be "misguided."(26)

This same Francis Wayland enters the drama sketched by Rudolph and others as an accurate observer of the collegiate scene only after he has been enlightened by experiences at Brown. His role is chiefly that of the prophet unjustly and unwisely spurned. It is through Wayland's eyes that we learn "of the isolation of the traditional colleges from the American people," a situation in which "each institution 'plods on its weary way solitary and in darkness.'" Rudolph finds him "suspicious of faculty psychology," and suggests that Wayland's reform efforts at Brown were thwarted by a "local elite." After a seemingly "endless quarrel with the Brown corporation," Wayland did, however, obtain an opportunity to try out his version of a more practical and attractive curriculum at Brown in the early 1850s.(27)

Although both Wayland and most of his reforms were gone within five years, a better than sixty percent jump in enrollments occurred between 1850-51 and 1853-54. Rudolph's figures are accurate, but is this a good indication of long-thwarted popular demand for nonclassical higher education finally finding an outlet? Rudolph suggests the additional 75 to 100 students enrolling annually during these years is an affirmative answer. The reforms lacked staying power, he explains, mainly because of insufficient funding to establish new departments of instruction in sufficient number or depth. Sources cited in support of this interpretation are Bronson's **History of Brown** and R. Freeman Butts' **The College Charts its Course.**(28) Since Butts cites only Bronson in discussing Wayland and Brown, it might be interesting to see what other relevant informaton and perspectives on the data Bronson provides. Given the high level of industrial development in Providence and the entire state of Rhode Island, Bronson finds that the enrollment increase "though encouraging, was far from satisfactory." It did not, he argues, indicate a high public esteem for scientifc education. The evidence primarily points to a market for lower academic standards in any subject studied.(29) Is this all that Wayland's perceptiveness as an observer of the contemporary collegiate scene really amounts to? After studying the information and assessments presented in Bronson's chapter on Wayland's "New System," one might reasonably arrive at such a conclusion.

Some of the details presented in this review of dramatis personae may be too obscure for a historian with general interpretive responsibilities to dig up. Little more than a mild curiosity or skepticism would,

however, lead any scholar to readily accessible enrollment statistics summarized in most early nineteenth-century catalogs and in some institutional histories. And even brief exploration of these most elementary of student statistics within their institutional contexts gives little support to the established interpretation of antebellum colleges.

Beyond the level of individual institutions there are some regional data frequently cited as a backdrop to the traditional drama of collegiate unpopularity. Wayland himself collected some for the New England colleges.(30) Rudolph cites two other studies. The first was compiled in 1870 by the President of Columbia, F. A. P. Barnard. If statistical evidence for public disfavor with the antebellum curriculum cannot be found at Yale in 1828, Union in the 1830s, Harvard in the early 1840s or Brown in the early 1850s, perhaps supporting data can be located with the help of a New York City perspective after the Civil War.

Rudolph tells us that Barnard's statistics "demonstrated that the enrollment capacities of a still growing number of colleges were increasing at a greater rate than the college-going student population," and that "Barnard had the wit to recognize the real difficulty: the classical course." Actually, Barnard makes no survey of increasing enrollment capacities in this pamphlet and computes no growth rate for the total number of college students. Even if he did, it is difficult to see what such computations would mean for the popularity of classical curricula. Barnard does assert that the nation could be more efficiently served by fewer colleges and that Columbia could better serve the limited market for traditional college education in

New York City if spared the competition from New York University and City College of New York. He further assesses the local market for college students by examining current enrollments of New York City residents at twenty colleges in nearby states and computes some ratios of students to total population in these states for 1840, 1860, and the late 1860s. Connections between unencouraging enrollment data and a claim that this was a sign of declining public interest in the classical curriculum are made only in terms of few suggestions from Barnard that Columbia might liberalize its curriculum, and in a reference to statistics presented in his annual report for 1866.(31) Flaws in this earlier report are serious and would require extended discussion. A second study cited by Rudolph was prepared by Professor Edward Hitchcock of Amherst in 1877. These statistics, Rudolph says, "demonstrated that the country's population had been increasing at twice the rate of college-going." In fact, Hitchcock's pamphlet deals only with students from Massachusetts attending eleven New England colleges.(32)

Rudolph's book clearly indicates the elusive and at times gossamer nature of student statistics used to support long-established portrayals of antebellum colleges being out of touch with their times. How much longer, then, will the period continue to be described in terms of "reactionary" early nineteenth-century colleges overthrown by the university "revolution" after the Civil War? As Rudolph himself seems to realize at one brief point in the text, the hard facts suggest that changes in curriculum and enrollment growth were "incremental" rather than dramatic.(33) Historical analysis along these lines and consistent

with what student statistics can support will probably have less drama but greater accuracy.

What new models and themes might emerge from such analyses? We can at least anticipate development of more sophisticated notions of how supply and demand operate in higher education. We might begin to see some interesting interactions between the persuasive powers of colleges and the economic and other forces shaping individual and public responses. As colleges encounter the complex demographic and economic challenges of the 1980s, historians can contribute important analytical perspectives on the ecological issues of higher education.

NOTES

1 For a review of the early studies of college student populations, see David B. Potts, "Students and the Social History of American Higher Education," **History of Education Quarterly** 15 (Fall 1975): 317-27.

2 For historiographic analysis and alternative interpretations, see David B. Potts, "'College enthusiasm!' as Public Response, 1800-1860," **Harvard Educational Review** 47 (February 1977): 28-42; and James McLachlan, "The American College in the Nineteenth Century: Toward a Reappraisal," **Teachers College Record** 80 (December 1978): 287-306.

3 Since this essay was written, the publication of Lawrence A. Cremin's **American Education: The National Experience, 1783-1876** (New York: Harper Row), 1980, pp. 270-80, 400-409, provides a portrayal more in keeping with recent scholarship, in which colleges are viewed as evolving within a broad cultural and institutional context. For recent statements of the established interpretation, see John S. Brubacher and Willis Rudy, **Higher Education in Transition**, 3rd ed. rev. and enl. (New York: Harper Row, 1976), pp. 35, 69-74; and Burton J. Bledstein, **The Culture of Professionalism: The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America** (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1976), p. 203.

4 Frederick Rudolph, **Curriculum: A History of the Undergraduate Course of Study Since 1636** (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1977), p. xi.

5 Ibid., pp. 53, 55-58, 60, 61, 77, 99, 102.

6 Frederick Rudolph, **The American College and University: A History** (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962) chaps. 3-11; Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, **The Development of Academic Freedom in the United States** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), chap. 5; Richard Hofstadter, "The Revolution in Higher Education," in **Paths of American Thought**, editors Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Morton White (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1963), pp. 269-90; and Lawrence Veysey, "Stability and Experiment in the American Undergraduate Curriculum," in **Content and Context: Essays on College Education**, editor Carl Kaysen (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973), pp. 1-63.

7 Rudolph, **American College**, p. 134

8 Rudolph, **Curriculum**, pp. 71-72.

9 Ibid., pp. 75, 74-75, 74, 73, 75.

10 Ibid., pp. 68, 113, 209-10.

11 Walter B. Kolesnik, **Mental Discipline in Modern Education** (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958); Henry Ellis, **The Transfer of**

Learning (New York: Macmillan Company, 1965), p. 64; and David G. Winter et al., "Grading the Effects of a Liberal Arts Education," **Psychology Today** 12 (September 1978): 69-74, 106.

12 See, for example, Rudolph's use on p. 73 of R. Freeman Butts, **The College Charts Its Course** (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1939) and his use on p. 75 of Veysey, "Stability and Experiment..."

13 David F. Allmendinger, Jr., **Paupers and Scholars: The Transformation of Student Life in Nineteenth-Century New England** (New York: St. Martins Press, 1975).

14 Yale College, annual catalogues, 1828-1860.

15 Ibid., pp. 79-84.

16 Ibid., pp. 78-79.

17 Robert A. McCaughey, **Josiah Quincy, 1772-1864: The Last Federalist** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 147-48, 163-78.

18 Ibid., p. 249.

19 Richard J. Storr, **The Beginnings of Graduate Education in America** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), chap. 4.

20 McCaughey, **Josiah Quincy**, p. 169.

21 Rudolph, **Curriculum**, pp. 85-87.

22 Codman Hislop, **Eliphalet Nott** (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1971), p. 227.

23 Ibid., p. 232; and note from Hislop, August 20, 1978.

24 John S. Whitehead, **The Separation of College and State: Columbia, Dartmouth, Harvard, and Yale, 1776-1876** (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 127.

25 Franklin B. Hough, **Historical and Statistical Record of the University of the State of New York during the century from 1784 to 1884** (Albany, New York: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1885), p. 168.

26 Cornelius Van Santvoord, **Memoirs of Eliphalet Nott, D. D., LLD. for Sixty-two Years President of Union College...** (New York: Sheldon and Company, ca. 1876), pp. 152-54.

27 Rudolph, **Curriculum**, pp. 87-88, 109.

28 Ibid., p. 110; Walter C. Bronson, **The History of Brown University, 1764-1914** (Providence, R.I.: Brown University, 1914); and Butts, **The College Charts Its Course.**

29 Bronson, **History of Brown**, pp. 282-90, 321-23.

30 Francis Wayland, **Report to the Corporation of Brown University on Changes in the System of Collegiate Education, Read March 28, 1850**

(Providence, R.I.: George H. Whitney, 1850), pp. 28-31.

31 Rudolph, **Curriculum**, p. 101; F. A. P. Barnard, **Analysis of Some Statistics of Collegiate Education; A Paper Read Before the Trustees of Columbia College, New York, January 3rd, 1870, by the President of the College (New York: Columbia University, 1870).**

32 Rudolph, **Curriculum**, p. 101; Edward Hitchcock, **On the Decrease of the Relative Number of College-Educated Men in Massachusetts during the Present Century** (n.p., n.d. [ca. 1877]).

33 Rudolph, **Curriculum**, p. 84.

The Bryn Mawr Workers' Summer School, 1921-1933: A Surprising Alliance

Rita R. Heller

The Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers, which continued from 1921 to 1938, was an experiment in social feminism.(1) Giving priority to the general effort to achieve social justice, social feminists may be distinguished from "hard core" feminists who devoted all their energies to the women's rights agenda. Social feminism survived the progressive years and continued the work of social justice into the otherwise quiescent Harding-Coolidge era.(2) The Bryn Mawr Workers' Summer School built on the accomplishments of the most noted organizations of social feminists, the National Women's Trade Union League (NWTUL) and the National Consumer's League (NCL). All shared a belief in gradualism and voluntarism and a wish to attack the results of industrialization by bridging economic and social classes.

At the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers, the women's social justice movement joined ranks with a fledgling labor education movement. The latter was a loose network of academics, unionists, liberals and socialists unified by a Jeffersonian vision of

education and a commitment to organized labor. The pioneering effort at Bryn Mawr quickly gained recognition as a model. It set the pattern for subsequent programs conducted at the Brookwood Labor College, the Vineyard Shore School for Women Workers, the Barnard Summer School, the University of Wisconsin Summer School and the Southern Summer School. These schools opened in the 1920s but with the disappearance of private funds in the depression and legitimization of the organized labor movement, few survived the 1930s.

The appearance of a workers' summer school at Bryn Mawr, an elite college, albeit during a time of social feminist activism, was the result of singular contributions of two key personalities: M. Carey Thomas and Hilda "Jane" Worthington Smith. One woman provided the vision, the other the stewardship. It was the autocratic educator and feminist, M. Carey Thomas who introduced the idea of opening a workers' school at Bryn Mawr, the College she had dominated as Dean and President for thirty-five years. And while innovative geniuses defy categorization, it is still fair to term Thomas' final enterprise, the workers' summer school, as surprising. How was it that this crusading feminist, who had devoted a life's energies to the attainment of feminine academic elitism, embraced abruptly the cause of downtrodden working women? An idealistic concern with uplifting weavers and garment workers appears to be at odds with, if not completely antithetical to, Thomas' world view.

Evidence from the newly opened Thomas Papers suggests that close relatives in the Whitall Pearsall Smith family influenced Thomas throughtout her life.(3)

Her mother's oldest sister, Hannah Whitall Pearsall Smith, was a formidable iconoclast.(4) She was an author and orator who embraced feminism, temperance and evangelical Quakerism. Hannah Smith expatriated to England in the 1880s where she quickly penetrated the intellectual avant garde. One of her daughters married art critic Bernard Berenson, another married philosopher Bertrand Russell. The latter daughter, Alys Russell, was a companion and correspondent of M. Carey Thomas. Among the many interests of this group of British intellectuals was the Workers' Education Association (WEA), which was a thriving enterprise by the time of M. Carey Thomas' visit to London as part of a 1919-1920 world tour. The WEA, brainchild of Albert Mansbridge, a clerk and product of the cooperative movement, had the support of a remarkable coalition of Anglican bishops, Oxford dons and self-educated men. Activated by the Christian Socialist belief that the educationally deprived suffered primarily from spiritual malaise, the movement was suffused with their type of spiritualism. Mansbridge's favorite phrase was, "the glory of education."(5) The WEA curriculum was grounded in the social sciences, intending to prepare students for "life, not livelihood."(6) It was to provide no training in trade unionism and was strictly non-vocational. Instruction was carried on in tutorial sections of 16 to 32 workingmen and women, each of which met for two hours weekly for three successive winters. J. F. C. Harrison, historian of the British workers education movement, has provided the following judgment:

> The idea of an equal partnership between the university and the working class movement, the emphasis upon the scholarship of

> the tutor coupled with the necessity of teaching subjects from the angle of the students' needs and the conception of the social purpose behind all studies, gave a distinctive slant to the typical tutorial class.(7)

The workers school, which rapidly assumed a reality at Bryn Mawr in 1921, drew heavily on the WEA as well as other British models as developed by Fabians and the National Council of Labor Colleges. Other types of embryonic workers' educational programs were in operation in the United States at the time of Thomas' activities, pre-dating her work by five or six years. They were, first, the schools run expressly for the training of women labor leaders, the National Women's Trade Union League (NWTUL) School in Chicago, and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) School in New York and, second, schools with an explicit ideological purpose, such as the Socialist Rand School in New York. The Bryn Mawr experiment emulated the British precedents in curricular philosophy and tutorial approach and in its deliberate fostering of alliances among incompatible constituencies and institutions. The School brought privileged, educated women into a partnership with poor and uneducated women. Also requisite to its functioning was a working relationship among diverse, if not hostile institutions. The College establishment, and its capitalist network, were the main sources of financial support of a school to benefit and nurture women workers and indirectly the labor movement. The predominantly white Anglo Saxon college alumnae groups were invited to work for the School and recruit students among the heavily immigrant laboring classes. Beginning in 1927 Blacks were welcomed into the student body. As a residential

school the Bryn Mawr experiment represented a significant departure from the British as well as the prevailing American models. Most of the later schools in this country followed its lead by operating residential programs.

The Bryn Mawr Summer School was founded after M. Carey Thomas returned from her world tour which included visits to her relatives in London and to the well known workers' school at Ruskin College, Oxford. Later, she alluded to the influence of these visits when she described her inspiration for founding the School:

> One afternoon at sunset I was sitting on my golden hilltop in the Sahara rejoicing that British women had just been enfranchised and American women would soon be politically free...I saw as part of my vision that the coming of equal opportunity for the manual workers of the world might be hastened by utilizing the deep sex sympathies that women now feel for each other...I realized that the first step on the path might well be taken by college women who, just emerging from the wilderness, know best of all women living under fortunate conditions, what it means to be denied access to things of the intellect and spirit.(8)

The evidence suggests that the crusading, impressionable and unpredictable Thomas was captivated by the benefits to come to Bryn Mawr from so ambitious an exercise in noblesse oblige. This is not to question the sincerity of her purpose as a feminist, suffragist and educational innovator, but rather to underscore the complexity of her motivation. According to the available accounts, archival and personal,

Thomas had no appreciation of the ramifications of her enterprise. "President Thomas didn't realize that a workers' school would plunge Bryn Mawr into the heart of the organized labor movement."(9)

The woman who offered the above judgment was the second key personality, the one tapped by Thomas to transform her dream into a reality. She named as Director of the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers Hilda "Jane" Worthington Smith, who was Dean of Undergraduates and who already had a sense of the potential and promise of a woman workers' school. Smith, submerged by melancholia over her mother's death and herself yearning to break out of the confines of educating daughters of the middle classes, was electrified by the surprising assignment, although she had an appropriate background for it. After college at Bryn Mawr, she attended the New York School of Philanthropy and in 1916 founded a college-related settlement house close to Bryn Mawr. Even while serving as Dean, Smith followed these interests and organized an educational program for the College's gardeners, electricians and cooks in which she displayed both a bold originality and a capacity to surmount traditional class boundaries between administration and hired staff. Smith headed the summer school for thirteen years, until 1933, and became its revered symbol. It was Smith, therefore, who took Thomas' nobly conceived but superficially understood idea and made it viable.

In addition to Smith, Thomas secured the services of leading social feminists to design the summer school. Susan M. Kingsbury,(10) who only five years earlier had been drafted to launch Bryn Mawr's

pioneering Carola Woerishoffer Graduate Department of Social Economy and Social Research (later the Graduate Department of Social Work), was Thomas' main link to the social feminist world. On March 19, 1921, Thomas convened a notable group in the exotic reception rooms of the College's Deanery, filled with her travel memorabilia. Present were Mary Anderson of the Women's Bureau, Fannia Cohn of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), Mrs. Robert Speer of YWCA, and labor economist David Saposs. NWTUL women who endorsed the idea but were not present included Rose Schneiderman, Margaret Dreier Robbins, Agnes Nestor, Mabel Gillespie, Frieda Miller and Pauline Newman.

The School was firmly rooted in the democratic belief that a democracy's vitality depended on the universal capacity to think. Thomas' dynamic feminism caused her to extend this progressive vision to laboring women convinced that they too could benefit from exposure to the liberal, humanist heritage. In 1921 that was a novel and exciting idea. At its outset the School strove primarily to enhance individual capacity. What became obvious over time was the efficacy of the group social educative process. Collegiate women and academics interacted with workers. Within the student body were southern fundamentalists and Russian immigrant socialists, rural whites and urban blacks. Unionized city garment workers met small town YWCA-affiliated factory operatives

Educational Objectives

The School's purpose can be viewed as either idealistic, inclusive, and timeless or as ambiguous, utopian, and naive. Not surprisingly, radicals

eschewed it completely perceiving it as a dangerous coopting of the working classes. According to brochures and publicity releases from the School its purpose was:

> to offer young women in industry opportunities to study liberal subjects and train themselves in clear thinking. The teaching is conducted in a spirit of impartial inquiry with freedom of discussion and freedom of academic teaching. The School is not committed to any dogma or theory. It is hoped that thus the students may acquire a truer insight into the problems of the industrial order, may increase their influence and may add to the happiness of their own lives.(11)

The creation of a community of industrial women, representing a cross-section of occupations, regions, religions, and races, with a balance maintained between union and non-union workers, was the principle governing the selection process. The School welcomed as applicants women between the ages of 18 and 34, who had a common school education and two years of industrial experience. The term worker referred to someone working with the tools of her trade, not in a supervisory capacity. Specifically excluded were teachers, clerical workers, and saleswomen. From its applicants the School sought evidence of maturity, leadership, intellectual curiosity and a consciousness of economic problems. Drafted into the recruiting process were members of all its allied constituencies.

The Student Body

Margaret Fulton, a shoe factory employee of Syracuse, New York was president of her branch of the

Y, the Grey Shoe YWCA. Helen America of New York, an ILGWU member, worked in the Helene Dress Company. Both these women applied to and were accepted by the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women-Workers in 1924. Ruby Haigwood, an R. J. Reynolds Tobacco company worker of Winston Salem, North Carolina, was president of the Sunshine Club of her Baptist Church. Helen Maver from Tacoma, Washington, was an unemployed candy factory operative and YWCA member. Haigwood and Maver were rejected in 1924. These four women were drawn from a sample of 197 applications to the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers for the years 1924, 1929 and 1931.(12)

Two analyses of the student body have been completed. For the years 1924 and 1931 the two accepted groups were compared with each other and then with those rejected. Between 1924 and 1931 union membership among those accepted had increased from 33 percent to 55 percent while the percentage of foreign born had doubled from 30 percent to 61 percent. Needle trades, including garment and textile workers, remained constant at a little less than one-half the class (43 percent vs. 44 percent). "Other factory workers" in the class declined from 38 percent to 18 percent and millinery workers increased from 9 percent to 18 percent. The percentage who had ever voted remained relatively constant (50 percent vs. 44 percent) despite the higher numbers of foreign born. The 1931 group was slightly better educated (a 9th grade vs. 8th grade education) and older (25.8 vs. 24.7). The 1924 group was actually more active in their sponsoring organizations than those seven years later. Thirty-four percent of the 1924 class were organization presidents, shop chairwomen or members of their union's

executive board, and 45 percent held only a minor or no office. By 1931 only 12 percent held the major offices and 59 percent held a minor or no office.

Significantly, in both years there was a higher percentage of union membership in the accepted than the rejected groups: 1924; 33 percent vs. 23 percent, 1931: 55 percent vs. 17 percent. Rejected applicants were more likely to be unemployed in both years (1924: 15 percent vs. 0 percent; 1931: 7 percent vs. 4 percent). The rejected group of 1924 was less likely to have voted than those accepted (24 percent vs. 50 percent) but in 1931 the rejected group was slightly more likely to have voted (50 percent vs. 44 percent). In 1924 there were almost equal percentages of foreigners in the accepted and rejected categories (30 percent vs. 31 percent) while in 1931 foreign born students were over represented in the accepted category (61 percent vs. 13 percent).

Rejected students in both years had only minimally less schooling. (In 1924: 7.4 vs. 8.0 years. In 1931: 8.9 vs. 9.0) The 1931 rejected were substantially younger (21.9 vs. 25.8). The rejected group of both years had greater percentage of organizational non-office holders: (1924: 46 percent vs. 32 percent; 1931: 53 percent vs. 46 percent).

The statistical data can be compared to the School's declared admissions policy. The preliminary analysis verifies a correspondence between practice and abstract pronouncement. It shows, for instance, that there were higher percentages of union members in the accepted as compared to the rejected groups. In the early years of the School's operation, that particular

criterion was frustrated because so few women were union members. The dramatic increase from 33 percent to 55 percent unionized between 1924 and 1931 reflects not the growth of unionized women, but rather the more effective involvement by the unions in the selection process. By the final year of the School's operation, 1938, two-thirds of the students were active union members. Secondly, my impression from looking over the applicants' occupational history suggests that that information was very carefully evaluated by the admissions people.

In one area the data analysis ran counter to expectation. Since the interviews explicitly sought evidence of leadership, one would naturally have assumed that the accepted and rejected candidates had answered the questions, "What office have you held in the organization?" very differently. However, major office holders were no more likely to be accepted than rejected (both 28 percent), although minor office holders were more likely to be accepted (33 percent vs. 21 percent).

Apart from those in union membership and place of birth, few dramatic trends emerged from the foregoing data analysis of the application material. Six of the twenty-six questions elicited open-ended responses on such subjects as books read, classes attended and courses of interest at the School. These areas appear to have been more crucial determinants of admission and hence evaluation of them should prove a richer path of investigation. A perusal of admitted womens' answers to "tell what you have read recently?" yielded the following selection of authors: Charles & Mary Beard; Sinclair Lewis, Upton Sinclair, Jack London; Confucius;

Gorky; George Bernard Shaw; Turgenev, Dumas; Dickens. Periodicals listed were The Post; the **Women's Home Companion**, the **Nation**, **The Manchester Guardian**.

Since figures are unavailable, the degree of competitiveness in the admissions procedure is a matter of speculation. Based on my counts of the rejected and accepted forms, I estimate that 57 percent of applicants were admitted in 1924 (105 accepted; 79 rejected), 78 percent of applicants were admitted in 1931 (91 accepted; 25 rejected).

Curriculum

The School shared the methodological and curricular philosophy of the WEA, but in the Bryn Mawr setting this philosophy assumed a very distinctive character. Teaching method and course content were continually evolving to meet changing student needs and interests. Three constants did give some stability to the instructional environment: a commitment to humanistic education; a faculty drawn exclusively from the eastern academic community, not from the labor movement; and the presence of a policy-making arm, the Joint Administrative Committee, composed of equal numbers of Bryn Mawr (faculty and alumnae) and industrial women (national spokeswomen from the NWTUL and other social-feminist organizations and Summer School alumnae.)(13)

The curriculum underwent revision throughout the School's history. In the early years students encountered an ambitious liberal arts program. The Class of 1923, for example, had an eleven hour course of study divided as follows: Modern Industrial Society

(four hours), English (two hours), Hygiene (one hour), and an elective in either History, Art, Literature or Science (four hours).(14) Hilda Smith and her faculty discovered that so diverse a curriculum was overwhelming for their average unschooled student. As a consequence, by the 1930s, the curriculum was redesigned to focus on a core of practical English and economics, with science and the arts as secondary activities.(15) The core was taught by an instructional team composed of one economist and one professor of English assigned to a 20 member student "unit." The professorial team was responsible for creating an integrated learning experience.(16) The practice of using undergraduate tutors, recruited from the women's Seven Sister Colleges, to supervise tutorial sections, continued as it had from the School's inception.

The inevitable gap between academicians new to experimental labor education and working class students was bridged by a number of techniques. The students' work experience constituted the point of departure for all instruction. Student autobiographies and current events were standard items. Amy Hewes, a Mount Holyoke economist who through years of Summer School service became one of its revered teachers, described the experimental learning process:

> Classes in English Composition often started with the writing of autobiographies. Hygiene might begin with the study of the physical motions required to perform an industrial operation. How could strains be avoided and energy conserved? In the case of a group of textile workers a study

ended in the composition and performance of the "Dance of the Weavers," set to appropriate music.(17)

Various writing assignments, autobiographically-based, filled the study hours. In 1930 and 1931, the Depression was the unifying theme in economics classes. Students chronicled their unemployment experiences in depression case histories: "The Effect of Unemployment on My Family and Me": "My Experience of Being Unemployed": "What Made Me Hold On."(18) In addition, the Summer School produced at least one yearbook-literary magazine a summer. These contained a variety of prose and poetry efforts, again drawn primarily from the students' work lives.

In 1934, during a crisis at the School described below, critics alleged that the curriculum had become radicalized. The School's charter had authorized "impartial" "non-dogmatic" inquiry. Had it even been possible to adhere to those principles? As early as 1922, in Amy Hewes' economics classes, at least, value-laden not value-neutral instruction prevailed. She presented the following arguments in her syllabus on "The Role of the Worker."(19)

PRESENT INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
PART III THE ROLE OF THE WORKER

The economic power of the individual worker is less than that of the capitalist for:

A. The employer has superior knowledge of market conditions and superior bargaining skill.

B. The employer is fighting for profits, not life.

C. Employers, in a competitive system, have to use all their economic power against workers because the public demands them to lower prices on their goods.

Professor Hewes' course outline delineated union principles and program as follows:

2. Union Principles:

a. Essential antagonism between employer and employee on the question of output. Employers' chief desire to increase output, reduce costs (unit costs) is met by union's restriction of output which is held to be necessary to retain the job and maintain wages.

b. Competition between workers which makes for unfair bargains and insecurity of the job must be eliminated and workers must act as a unit.

3. Union Programs:

a. To make the bargaining strength of the weakest the bargaining strength of the group.

b. To strengthen the bargaining strength of the group against the employer.

In that course, there clearly was an anti status-quo, pro-union bias. Still more revolutionary sentiments were found in the statement of W. O. Thompson (an NRA Board member) in the curriculum used by the faculty team of Emanuel Blum and Ellen Kennan in 1934.(20) (The presence of Blum, a Communist Party member, on the faculty of the School attested to the students' influence. They had lobbied for and won his hiring in 1933.) W. O. Thompson's statement read:

> The trend of the National Recovery Administration has been and continues to be toward the development of monopoly capitalism in the United States.
>
> The NRA handed over to trade associations dominated by the largest corporations in the various industries, the formulation of codes of fair competition without representation of the consumers or workers...As a result of these conditions small business is being oppressed.
>
> The amount of goods that can be bought by workers with declining real earnings has dropped as a result of price advances created by monopolistic practices.
>
> The only solution involves a change in class relationships. Only a government by workers and farmers can plan production, produce goods for use and not for profit, eliminate poverty and raise the standards of living of the entire population.

The above mentioned cases highlighted an economic point of view which by the early 1930s had begun to permeate instruction at the School. Certainly the interview data gives this impression, as it does that students left the School with altered political and economic opinions.(21)

Although the School had achieved educational success, depression generated external and internal crises mortally wounded its operation. The Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers depended for its continuance on cooperation among incompatible forces: conservative and liberal College trustees and alumnae,

union sponsors, Industrial Clubs of the YWCA, business and industrial leaders, and academicians. While it was possible for a tenuous equilibrium to be maintained in the quiescent 1920s, the charged political atmosphere of the thirties proved its undoing. By the thirties more students in louder voices expressed their socialist and communist leanings. A Communist Party member was on the faculty. Ironically, the College's fiftieth anniversary million dollar endowment campaign coincided with the radical developments within the School. Conservative members of the College's Board of Trustees (Mrs. Learned Hand, for one, who had always been uncomfortable with the College's "leftist" labor school) were eager to seize any excuse to evict the School. Their opposition was exacerbated by the need to raise additional endowment funds for the College. The event that galvanized the opposing forces was the Seabrook Farms Strike of 1934.

The particulars of the crisis are easily summarized. A long-standing agreement had barred the School's participation, as a school, in strikes, although individuals were free to express themselves in strike activities. What occurred between July 10-12, 1934 was the involvement, as individual observers, of economist Colston Warne and sociologist Mildred Fairchild in the strike called by the workers at the Seabrook Farms in Bridgeton, New Jersey. By going to the strike "to be damned nuisances, if possible",(22) the two faculty members violated no agreement and broke no rules with the Bryn Mawr Board of Trustees. They observed a confrontation between police and teargassed strikers and gave a story to reporters. The next day, Bryn Mawr made the Philadelphia newspapers. This, of course, was just the turn of events for which the

conservatives, influenced by Frances Fincke Hand, were looking. They claimed the School had violated the no-strike agreement. The controversy grew into a cause celebre of hysterical proportions resulting in the School's eviction for the summer of 1935. Although the Summer School returned to Bryn Mawr from 1936 to 1938, its momentum was gone and its energies spent.

The Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers was rooted in social feminism and M. Carey Thomas' idealism. Her millenialistic rhetoric envisioning a cross-class feminist alliance among women to help usher in a new industrial order provided the imprimatur for the ambitious experiment whose nuts and bolts operation was turned over to Jane Smith. While it lasted, the School performed admirable work. In its two decade operation it bridged the chasm dividing women by class and education and demonstrated the intellectual capacities of laboring women. Smith proved to be a transcendent figure, capable of maneuvering among conflicting interest groups and ideologies. But the School did lack an institutional permanance; Smith was the source of its equilibrium, clear-eyed confidence, and its seventeen year continuity. In truth, the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers had been imposed on a fragile reality. Yet it was an extraordinary institution overcoming differences in social class, education and life experience.

NOTES

1 The organizational files of the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers are located at the following repositories: American Labor Education Service Papers, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York (hereafter cited as ALES Papers-Cornell); the Bryn Mawr School for Women Workers Papers, Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey; American Labor Education Service Papers Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin ALES Papers - Wisconsin. Partial collections are located among the M. Carey Thomas Papers, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr Pennsylvania (MCT Papers), and the Hilda Worthington Smith Papers, Schlesinger Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts (HWS Papers). Within three years of the demise of the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers, Florence Hemley Schneider's **Patterns of Workers' Education: The Story of the Bryn Mawr Summer School** (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), appeared. Schneider's work, based on her doctoral dissertation from the Bryn Mawr Carola Woerishoffer Graduate Department of Social Economy, is largely an institutional history. She worked primarily from published materials on workers' education. Her evaluative chapter drew on her analysis of the short-term level of communal involvement undertaken by returning Bryn Mawr Summer School students in three cities,

Rochester, Niagara Falls and Pittsburgh. Schneider's work did not address itself to the long-term impact of attendance at the Bryn Mawr Summer School for Women Workers.

2 J. Stanley Lemons discusses social feminist contributions to post-progressive reform in **The Woman Citizen: Social Feminism in the 1920s** (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. v-xii.

3 See correspondence between M. Carey Thomas and Hannah Whitall Pearsall Smith, MCT Papers.

4 Earl C. Kaylor, Jr., "Hannah Whitall Pearsall Smith," in **Notable American Women**, ed. Edward T. James (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3:313-316.

5 J. F. C. Harrison, **Learning and Living, 1870-1960: A Study in the History of the English Adult Education Movement** (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), p.263

6 Albert Mansbridge quoted in Margaret T. Hodgen, **Workers Education in England and the United States** (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1925), p. 140.

7 Harrison, p. 269.

8 M. Carey Thomas, "1922 address to the Bryn Mawr Summer School," quoted in Hilda Worthington Smith, **Women Workers at the Bryn Mawr Summer School** (New York: Affiliated Schools for Women Workers

in Industry and American Association for Adult Education, 1929), p. 4. See also Hilda Worthington Smith, **Opening Vistas in Workers Education: The Autobiography of Hilda Worthington Smith** (Washington, D. C.: By the author, 1978).

9 Interview with Hilda Worthington Smith, Washington, D. C., March, 1976.

10 See Mildred Fairchild Woodbury, "Susan Myra Kingsbury," in **Notable American Women**, op. cit. 2:235-36.

11 Appendix H in Hilda Worthington Smith, **Women Workers at the Bryn Mawr Summer School**, p. 304.

12 Student application forms from Boxes 8, 9, 10, ALES Papers - Wisconsin.

13 See Appendix C. in Hilda Worthington Smith, **Women Workers at the Bryn Mawr Summer School**, p. 271.

14 "1923 Publicity Brochure," HWS Papers, Box 12, Folder 221.

15 ALES Papers - Wisconsin, Boxes 12-17.

16 See Carol Hoffecker, "The Bryn Mawr Summer School: A Project in Search of a Purpose," Paper presented to the Third Berkshire Conference on the History of Women, Bryn Mawr College, 1976.

17 Amy Hewes, "Early Experiments in Workers' Education," **Adult Education** 6 (Summer 1956): 216.

18 "Unemployment Histories" ALES Papers-Cornell, Box 3.

19 Course Curricula of 1922, ALES Papers-Wisconsin, Box 2.

20 Course Curricula of 1934-38, ALES Papers-Wisconsin, Box 22.

21 Interviews with former tutors, faculty and administrators: Katherine Pollak Ellickson, Arlington, VA, May, 1977; Marguerite Gilmore, Washington, D. C., May 1977; Jean Flexner Lewinson, Arlington, VA, May 1977; Ida Craven Merriam, Arlington, VA, May 1977; Esther Peterson, Washington, D. C., January, 1977; Susan Shepherd Sweezy, Wilton, New Hampshire, July, 1980; Caroline Ware, Arlington, VA, May 1977; and Colston Warne, Mount Vernon, New York, September, 1976.
Interview with former student Elizabeth Nord, Providence, Rhode Island, July 1976.

22 Interview with Colston Warne.

The University under Mussolini: The Fascist-Catholic Struggle for Italian Youth, 1922-1943

Richard J. Wolff

The rise of Benito Mussolini and his Fascist movement in post World War I Italy did much to revolutionize European concepts of education. Within a short time of the 1922 march on Rome which brought the Fascists to power, educational theorists sympathetic to the new regime began to draw distinctions between education as "the reality of life" and instruction as "the realm of academics", the former being viewed as the strict preserve of the State.(1) The Italian Fascists, setting an example for their more efficient Nazi counterparts across the Alps, took an all-inclusive view of the State's educational mission. No longer was it sufficient to control various aspects of formal education, teacher training, the formation of curricula, the supervision of textbooks and the setting of admissions policies, for the Fascists believed it their duty to extend the State's influence on the youth beyond the classroom walls. In short, the arrival of Mussolini's Blackshirts in Rome ushered in an age of government sponsored youth organizations, reaching from the very youngest to the very oldest of students.

Yet despite all the Duce's efforts, Italian education during the Fascist period was never rigidly

monolithic, for a rather surprising diversity existed in matters of schooling. This was so, largely because of the powerful presence of the Roman Catholic Church in so many aspects of Italian life. Not only did Catholic schools in the Fascist period continue to function, but also, with the promulgation of the Riforma Gentile, their leaving certificates were for the first time considered equivalent to those of the public schools. Furthermore, it was the government of the Duce which, much to the satisfaction of the Vatican, extended state recognition to the degrees of the Catholic University at Milan. This is not to say, however, that Fascism simply welcomed competition in Italian education. Rather, Mussolini began his rule with his much publicized educational concessions to the Church in order to gain Vatican support for the suppression of the Catholic Partitio Popolare. In this, Duce was quite successful. By 1926, Don Luigi Sturzo and other leaders of the Popolari were dispersed or silenced, and Mussolini was able to turn his attention to the clipping of Catholicism's wings in the educational sphere. As a result, relations between the Church and State worsened progressively, reaching their nadir in the 1931 crisis over the issue of Catholic youth movements.(2)

Historians generally agree that Fascist influence, although strongly felt in the elementary levels of Italian education, had only a passing effect upon the university.(3) Despite the celebrated 1931 loyalty oath administered to the professoriat, the university curricula were virtually untouched by the Fascist authorities who preferred to reach the students through activities outside the classroom. This was attempted through the Gioventu Universitaria Fascista (GUF), the official organization of university students and the

cornerstone of Fascist influence among this educational elite.(4) However, the government was not alone in its recognition of the importance of capturing the future leaders of Italian society. In fact, the Catholic Church had been active in this camp for almost forty years through its own youth group, the Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana (FUCI), an autonomous wing of Catholic Action under the protection of the Holy See.

By and large, the leaders and members of each student organization held very different views about the nature of Church-State relations, the role of Catholicism in education and the merits of the new Fascist Order. The tensions between the Church and State in Fascist Italy were often reflected in the poor relations between the GUF and the FUCI, but even during periods of relative calm between the Vatican and the Italian government (notably 1935-1939), the Fascist and the Catholic university students were often at odds. Both Mussolini and Pius XI must have known that in the struggle for the Italian elite there could be no compromise, for the futures of their respective ideologies depended largely upon their success in influencing society's young professionals. In many respects, it was here on the campuses of Italy's twenty-six universities that Fascism met, and failed to vanquish, its greatest foe: the FUCI and the young Christian Democrats trained in its ranks.

The GUF and the FUCI

In 1928 Mussolini demonstrated the degree to which he valued the work of the GUF among the university students by appointing the then National Secretary of the Fascist Party, Augusto Turati, to the post of "Capo

di GUF". Turati held this position, which placed him at the head of an organization of some 4,000 students enrolled in the faculties of the universities and the "istituti superiori" and divided into the male, female and foreign student sections, until his replacement in 1931 by Carlo Scorza, the former Party chief of Lucca and intimate of the Duce.(5) At the same time, Scorza, like Turati, was made the Party Secretary, a position which he held until the fall of the regime in 1943.

Although autonomous from the structure of the university which was under the control of the Ministry of Public Instruction, the GUF was firmly positioned within the hierachy of the Fascist youth movements. Members of the GUF were expected to have passed through the Balilla and the Avaguardista before joining the university group.(6) This requirement was designed to exclude the less than enthusiastic Fascists who regarded membership in the GUF merely as a passport to future professional success. Under Scorza, however, the martial preparation a youngster received in the lower levels of the Fascist youth organizations was apparently not considered sufficient and in 1930 the Fascio Giovanili di Combattimento was formed. Designed for young men from the ages of eighteen to twenty-one in order to foster "moral, spiritual and warlike education", these fasci included GUF members of the appropriate age group who were required to enroll.(7) This injection of a militaristic spirit into the rather frivolous life style of the university students eventually took some root, as reflected in the pages of the GUF's weekly newpaper, **Libro e Moschetto**, the title of which was taken from the organization's motto: "Libro e Moschetto, fascista perfetto".(8)

Aside from being attired in the uniform of the

Fascio Giovanili di Combattimento, member students were involved in a series of activities, ranging from propaganda lectures to patriotic rallies to sporting and cultural events. Undoubtedly, the introduction of athletic events, a Fascist innovation at the universities, was most popular among the students and a great deal of prestige surrounded the awarding of the "Coppa di Duce" each year, but the Party hierarchy was more concerned about graduating young professionals thoroughly trained in Fascist ideology. Consequently, the leadership of the GUF consistenly supported cultural activities which, in fact, met with surprising success among the students. The annual "Littoriali", a national competition of written, oral and artistic presentations in all disciplines, became a mainstay of the GUF cultural program in 1934 and attracted much attention at the universities and in the press. Perhaps, however, the "Littoriali" had a side effect as undesirable as it was unexpected to the Fascist authorities, for as Edward Tannenbaum observed:

> The oral debates...were the freest forum in Fascist Italy, the only place where serious criticism of the regime was possible(9).

Given the great number of students enrolled in the GUF, it is difficult to believe that the overwhelming majority were more than nominal members. If we are to judge from the correspondence of Scorza, apathy among the GUF members seemed to be a perennial source of concern to the Fascist leader and receded only during the sporting events and the "Littoriali" competitions. In 1931, for example, he wrote to Mussolini:

> "The masses in the universities are not yet what the Duce wants...Among university students those farthest from us are students of juris

> prudence, literature, philosophy: The abstract subjects...I have found among the university students a lively sense of autonomy in their relations with the Party, and a spirited disregard of disciplinary and hierarchical bonds.(10)

Yet, one cannot easily discount the extensive influence of the organization. In truth, no matter what the attitude of most of the rank and file, there were certainly enough militants in the GUF and sufficient support from the regime to give it an obvious presence on the university campuses of interwar Italy.

For Catholic students of the Fascist period, there were also a series of youth organizations which were, for the most part, under the auspices of Catholic Action. Vigorously supported by Pope Pius XI who wished to be remembered as the "pope of Catholic Action", these groups included the Gioventu Cattolica Italiana, the Catholic Boy Scouts and the Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana and offered an alternative to the government controlled organizations. Although a branch of Catholic Action, the FUCI enjoyed considerable autonomy and generally cultivated direct relations with the Vatican rather than working through the channels of command familiar to other Catholic groups.

Founded in 1896, the Federazione had a long association with the nascent Christian democratic movement of Don Luigi Sturzo and these close ties with the left of center Partito Popolare were often loudly proclaimed by the Catholic students. For example, at their 1919 National Congress in Rome a motion was adopted characterizing the goal of the FUCI as leading to:

> ...the moral and intellectual preparation of the young in order to render them tomorrow good combatants in the camp of the Partito Popolare.(11)

It is no wonder, then, that in the turbulent years following World War I, the Fascists identified the Federazione with their political foes, the Popolari, and made the Catholic university students the object of their special brand of violence.

The Catholic students of the FUCI were separated into male and female branches, members being known respectively as "fucini" and "fucine". At the head of each division was a lay president and an ecclesiastical assistant, both appointed by the Vatican. The work of the movement was to be concentrated in three major areas: "...social action, the apostolate to university students, and full adherence to the work of Catholic Action."(12) For much of the Fascist period, the Federazione was led by Igino Righetti as president and Giovanni Battista Montini, the future Pope Paul VI, as ecclessiatical assistant, while toward the close of the Mussolini era, men such as Aldo Moro and Giulio Andreotti, both prominent postwar politicians, served as presidents, thus renewing the link between Christian democracy and the FUCI.

While many of the activities of the Federazione were cultural and intellectual and not overtly political, the Catholic students, especially under Righetti and Montini (1925-34), made little attempt to disguise their political views. In their publications **Azione Fucina** and **Studium**, the fucini championed neo-Scholastic philosophy and in the process attacked Giovanni Gentile, the Idealist philosopher of Fascism,(13) urged the acceptance of the broadest

possible interpretation of the Church's rights in civil society,(14) opposed formal peace betwen the papacy and the Italian state ("Counciliazione") and the Lateran Accords,(15) vigorously supported the pope in his attacks on Fascist educational theory,(16) and consistently criticized Hitler and the racial theories of Nazism.(17) It was not, in fact, the strictly religious activities of the Federazione, such as the "scuole di religione" or the "attivita missionaria", which upset the Fascist authorities, but rather the politically militant spirit of the Catholic students. Recognizing a certain hostility towards the regime within the ranks of the fucini, the government looked suspiciously even upon the Federazione's charitable work among the city poor, for Mussolini did not care to have the people reminded by these Catholic students that Fascism had failed to deal with the persistent poverty of the underclasses. The leaders of the GUF, in fact, complained about this activity as a thinly disguised effort on the part of the fucini to spread their political and social ideals among the people. In 1934, the secretary of the GUF in Viterbo wrote:

> "Among the activities of the FUCI, I believe it necessary to emphasize a kind of charitable work called the "Bread of St. Vincent": members of the FUCI visit needy families, bringing with them coupons to buy bread, milk, clothing, etc. and, at the same time, they do not let them forget where this help came from, (thus) exaggerating the spiritual and material advantages derived from joining the association (FUCI)"(18)

To the Fascist hierarchy, the irksome organization of university students was thorn in the side of the regime, but the government realized that its extraction would be no mean task. In fact, it was an achievement

never fully realized by Mussolini and his henchmen. Unswervingly supported by the pope who termed them the "apple of the Holy Father's eye"(19) and protected insofar as the existence of Catholic Action was guaranteed in the 1929 concordat, the fucini remained organized throughout the interwar period. Nonetheless, their lot was not an easy one, and relations between the Catholic students and their fascist counterparts in the GUF were often strained, sometimes violent and, only for a very brief period, harmonious.

Campus Violence: Clashes Between and GUF and the FUCI

Although cooperation between Catholic and Fascist authorities in Italy became increasingly common after 1931, the leader of the GUF and the FUCI seemed to find it difficult to come to any genuine understanding. Aside from the persistent and mutual animosity between the students themselves which complicated matters, the realization by both the Church and the State of the importance of wielding influence among the nation's intellectual elite made compromise in the realm of the university extremely unlikely. Pius XI may have acquiesced in the suppression of the Catholic Boy Scouts in 1929 and in termination of the sporting activities of Catholic Action in 1931, but he would never suffer the liquidation of the Federazione.

Tensions between the GUF and the FUCI ran very high at least until 1934 when public manifestation of hostility decreased markedly. The violent street clashes, their causes rooted in the Fascist belief that the Federazione was protecting ex-members of the illegal Partito Poplare and deliberately training an anti-Fascist elite,(20) were extremely common in the

twenties and even more frequent during the Crisis of 1931. The most notable single incident of this period was the 1926 disruption by Fascist students of the FUCI's National Congress at Macerata.(21) This attack, which resulted in the removal of the convention to the more friendly city of Assissi, prompted strong episcopal and papal protests to the Duce himself.(22) However, the events at Macerata paled in comparison to the violence of 1931 when the fucini were openly condemned by the regime, their organization temporarily suppressed, and their leaders forced to take refuge behind the walls of the Vatican.(23)

Even the signing of the much celebrated Lateran Accords in 1929 did not lessen the tension between the Fascist and Catholic students. Rather the situation only seemed to worsen as the GUF's call for cooperation between the FUCI and itself(24) was interpreted by the Catholic leadership as an attempt to weaken the Federazione. Indeed, both Righetti and Montini opposed the signing of the Lateran Accords and the overwhelming majority of fucini expressed dissatisfaction with the Vatican decision to make peace with Fascism.(25)

The crisis of 1931 saw the culmination of years of "bad blood" between the GUF and the FUCI. Vague innuendo gave way to open fascist charges of treason against the Catholic students(26) who in turn accused the Fascists of anti-clericalism.(27) Violence against the fucini was widespread throughout Italy, and the pope himself publicly condemned the government's attempts to intimidate and even dissolve the organization of Catholic students:

> "And here we find ourselves in the presence of a...proposal...to monopolize completely the young,

> from the tenderest years up to manhood and womanhood and for the exclusive advantage of a Party, of a regime based on an ideology which clearly resolves itself into true and real pagan worship of the state which is no less in contrast with the natural rights of the family than it is in contradiction to the supernatural rights of the church.(28)

Naturally, the intensity of the hostility between these two student groups compelled their leaders to supervise closely membership policies. Prior to the 1929 Conciliazione, for example, Righetti and Montini simply refused to permit the fucini to hold simultaneous membership in the GUF. Since the Vatican did not technically recognize the legality of the Italian State, this course of action was simple to justify, and Righetti frequently forced the presidents of Local FUCI chapters to relinquish their membership cards in the GUF or be ousted from office.(29) However, in the wake of the Lateran Accords, this FUCI policy appeared specifically anti-Fascist and the journals of the GUF were quick to point this out. Within the Federazione itself, the debate over the membership issue was lively, with Righetti in 1930 expressing concern over "infiltrations" of the leadership by Fascist students and insisting upon their exclusion from the Catholic organization. Monsignor Montini for his part agreed that the presence of Fascist students within the ranks of the Federazione posed some danger; but, more cautious than his colleague, he argued that elections of GUF members to local positions of authority be systematically reviewed but not necessarily forbidden by the national president.(30)

The problem of simultaneous membership in the GUF

and the FUCI was abruptly and arbitrarily solved in March 1931 when Carlo Scorza in the midst of the Catholic-Fascist crisis issued a directive ordering all GUF members to resign from the FUCI or face expulsion from the Fascist organization.(31) This victory by the more extreme elements in the Party was shortlived, as Mussolini within months pragmatically moved to end the crisis. In September, Scorza's order was revoked and a compromise was reached between the Vatican and the regime. The upshot of this agreement was seen in the increasing numbers of fucini enrolled in the GUF (almost 50 percent by 1936), a trend that the FUCI leadership was powerless to stem. Righetti and Montini's strict prohibition against simultaneous membership was lifted, but the new president of the Federazione, Giovanni Ambrosetti, remained steadfastly opposed to Catholic student leaders' involvement in the GUF. In an internal memorandum, Ambrosetti voiced his reservations concerning cooperation with the Fascist students:

> The FUCI believes the only possible contact with the GUF is: (a) to permit those members who wish---exclusive of the leadership---to take membership in the GUF; (b) to make arrangements (with the GUF) for certain events (e.g., conferences, religious functions).(32)

The close cooperation between the Catholic hierarchy and the Mussolini government which began with the 1931 September compromise seemed to have little effect upon the sentiments of most fucini. Although they took advantage of the relaxed membership policies and joined the GUF in increasing numbers, they generally did so to avoid suspicion and to enhance their chances for employment upon graduation. Indeed, this phenomenon was commonly recognized by the leaders

of the GUF:

> The majority of university students enrolled in the FUCI are also enrolled in the GUF. However, I believe that they hold GUF membership cards only because they believe it necessary to further their future professional lives.(33)

Reflecting this duplicity, FUCI documents constantly complained about the GUF: that their activities on campuses were often offensive to Catholic students, that the Fascist students "attended Mass only when the celebration takes on a political and patriotic tone, like commemorations of the war dead", and that the religion course for the GUF was a complete failure due to a lack of attendance.(34) Throughout the decades of Fascist rule, the correspondence of the FUCI leaders was replete with harsh words for the GUF and characterizations of the organization as "contrary to Christian Spirit" and "morally offensive" to Catholic students.(35) So strong were the anti-Fascist feelings of most students in the Federazione that they did not hesitate to criticize, anonymously of course, the Church hierarchy for pro-Mussolini sentiments. In 1930, for example, a group of fucini signing themselves "members of your diocese", responded to the archbishop of Milan's praise of Fascism with an acerbic letter severely critical of the prelate's view:

> No, Emminence, neither Catholic Italy which was a victim (of Fascism), nor the pope could bless the violent and bloody conquest of Fascism...but what is more important, the pope not only could not, but in fact never did bless Fascism.(36)

Obviously, the hostile and uncompromising

attitudes of the fucini did not go unnoticed in Fascist circles. In their meeting halls and in the pages of their publications, the students of the GUF vilified the Catholic students and accused them of subversive political activity and anti-Fascist sympathies.(37) Carlo Scorza himself was thought to have instigated the worst of the violence against the fucini(38) and contemptuously referred to the Catholic students' criticisms of the Fascist Order as nothing more than "splashes of mud by frogs on the trunk of the great Fascist tree".(39) Even after the close of the 1931 Fascist campaign against the youth organizations of the Church, Fascist authorities continued to expell individual students from the GUF because of their "overly zealous" work on behalf of the FUCI(40) and as late as 1938 local GUF chapters persisted in "intimidation...against those who continued their adherence to the FUCI."(41)

The Italian intervention in World War II further widened the breech between the Fascist and Catholic students. Naturally, the GUF enthusiastically rallied to the banner of the Duce, thanking him for the opportunity finally to wage war, (42) but the FUCI under Aldo Moro demonstrated a decided coolness towards an adventure which forced Italian soldiers to march at the side of the Nazis. No more astute than the leaders of the GUF, the prefect of Padova in a 1942 report warned of FUCI indifference to the fate of the Fascist government:

> The young universitari enrolled in the Catholic organization are all anti-Fascists. They show off their great love for the Fatherland and many of them have already sacrificed their lives in war, but they have a mentality all their own; they say to themselves "love

> the Fatherland and the king to the supreme sacrifice", but they are not Fascists.(43)

And in the same year, the secret police, in a report to the Minister of Interior, contended that even the spiritual retreats of the fucini were laced with political topics and that it would be unwise to believe that the Catholic students held any sympathy for the Fascist regime:

> The opinion of the members of the FUCI concerning the Fascist Regime is not very flattering. In fact, the Fascist Regime is considered as existing outside the bounds of the moral and human laws prescribed by Catholicism, not only for its theory, but also for its practical actions. The racial politics, propoganda based on the words of the Duce trying to convince the people to hate the enemy, and the alliance with non-Catholics are three points which are very much criticized.(44)

Within a year of the writing of this report, Mussolini was ousted from power and Italy headed by the King and Marshal Badoglio had withdrawn from the war against the Allies. True, Fascist resistence continued in the north in the sham Salo Republic, but for Fascism the struggle was over: the struggle not only for Italy itself, but also for the Italian youth.

Conclusion

During the Mussolini years, Catholic and Fascist forces fought an always persistent, sometimes violent battle for the minds and hearts of Italian university students. Destined for positions of power and influence in a nation with an elitist system of higher

education, these students were certaily a prize worth the effort. In terms of numbers, there were always many more GUF members than there were fucini, but statistics do not in this case stand alone. Despite unwavering opposition from the State and even occasional resistence from clerical-fascist elements in the Church, the FUCI largely remained a preserve of the Christian democratic ideals of Luigi Sturzo and his Popolari. And although the effort was not lacking, the GUF was never able to absorb the Catholic students or to cripple their organization by infiltration. Sullenly resigned to the continued activity of a FUCI protected by the Holy See, the leaders of the GUF could only harrass the Catholic students and rail against their anti-Fascism. When the rubble of World War II was cleared from the Italian cities and countryside, it was the young members of the FUCI and ex-fucini such as Guido Gonella, Aldo Moro, Guilio Andreotti, Benino Zaccagnini and Giovanni Battista Montini who took the lead in the reconstruction of a Christian democratic Italy.

NOTES

1 "Discorso al senato sugli accordi del Laterano," in Benito Mussolini, **Opera omnia di Benito Mussolini: Dagli accordi del Laterano al dodicesimo anniversario della fondzione dei fasci** (Florence, 1958), p. 101.

2 See, for example, Pietro Scoppola, **La Chiesa e il fascismo: Documenti ed interpretazioni** (Rome: Laterza, 1976); A. C. Jemolo, **Church and State in Italy, 1850-1950** (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960); Daniel A. Binchy, **Church and State in Fascist Italy** (Oxford University Press, 1970), reprint; and Richard J. Wolff, "Catholicism, Fascism and Italian Education from the Riforma Gentile to the Carta della Scuola, 1922-1939, "**History of Education Quarterly**, Spring 1980: 3-26.

3 Edward Tannenbaum, **The Fascist Experience: Italian Society and Culture, 1922-1945** (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 168.

4 As late as 1939, only 2.9 percent of the university-aged population were enrolled in the various faculties of higher education. The statistics were taken from the **Annuario Statistico Italiano** (Rome: Instituto Poligrafico dello Stato G. C., 1939). The computations are mine.

5 Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Gioventu Universitaria Fascista, busta 7, "G.U.F.: Ordinamento e norme per il loro funzionamento", 1932. Hereafter A.C.S., GUF.

6 A.C.S., GUF, busta 1, "Bizze, regolamento GUF," anno XV, articolo III.

7 A.C.S., GUF, busta 1, "Circolari del PNF,Z 17 October 1930.

8 See, in particular, issues of **Libro e Moschetto** from 1935 to 1943.

9 Edward Tannenbaum, op. cit., p. 129.

10 A.C.S., GUF, b. 1-23. Also, Michael A. Ledeen, "Italian Fascism and Youth", **Journal of Contemporary History** (v. 4, no. 3) July 1969, p. 141

11 G. Marcucci Fanello, **Storia della FUCI** (Rome: Editrice Studium, 1972), p. 60.

12 **Atti e documenti del XIV Congresso Cattolico Italiano: Friesole, 1896** (Padova, 1897), pp. 18ff.

13 See, for example, Guido Gonella's articles "I giovani italiani hanno un maestro di vita," **Azione Fucina**, 10 February 1929 and "Cattolicismo ed idealismo," **Azione Funina**, 23 June 1929.

14 Guido Gonella, "I rapporti fra lo stato e la Chiesa," **Azione Fucina**, 1 September 1929; "Discussione," **Studium** 10-11 (October-November 1929): 374.

15 Montini Publicly tried to make the best of the agreement which he felt compromised the church

(see Giovanni Battista Montini, "Ai fucini: parole buone dopo i fatti grandi," **Azione Fucina**, 24 February 1929). However, in his private correspondence, he expressed genuine misgivings concerning the wisdom of the Lateran Accords (Montini to Padre Bevilacqua, 9 January 1929 in Antonio Fappani and Franco Molinari, **Giovanni Battista Montini giovane: documenti inediti e testimonianze** (Rome: Marietti, 1979), p. 260.

16 G.B. Montini, "L'enciclica sull'educazione," **Azione Fucina** 20 January 1930.

17 See, for example, E. Rossi, "Le condizioni religiose in Germania dopo il concordato con la Santa Sede," Studium 9-10 (August-September 1934): 532 and Emilio Guano, "I guidei e Gesu," **Studium** 5 (May 1937): 312.

18 Quoted in Maria Cristina Giuntella, "L'organizzazione universitaria Fascista e la federazione universitaria cattolica in una relazione del G.U.F. di Viterbo," **Rivista di Storia della Chiesa in Italia**, XXVI, 1972, no. 1, p. 135.

19 Pio XI, "Ai soci del circolo romano, 6-3-28," in **Discorsi agli universitari** (Rome: Editrice Studium, 1932), p. 44.

20 A.C.S., Ministero dell'interno, Direzione Generale di Pubblica Sicurenzza, Divisions Affari Generali e Riservati, 1920-1945. Cat. G-1, busta 146. Azione Cattolica. "Prefect of Treviso to the Minister of Interior," 9 June 1935. Herafter, A.C.S., Min. Int., D.G.P.S., A.G.R.

21 A.C.S., Min. Int., D.G.P.S., A.G.R., Cat. C-2, pacco 83. "Prefect of Macerata to the Minister of Interior," 26 August 1926.

22 **Ibid.** "Mon. Luigi Ferretti to S.E. Benito Mussolini," 28 August 1926; Pio XI, op. cit...

23 A.C.S., Min. Int., D.G.P.S., A.G.R., Cat. G-1, busta 19, fascicolo 221. Prefettura di Roma," 16 May 1931; Idem., busta 183. "Incidenti tra fascisti e cattolici, 1931". Also, see A. Baroni, **Igino Righetti** (Rome: Studium, 1946), p. 98.

24 See "La gioventu fascista e quella cattolica possono collaborare?" **Libro e Moschetto**, 21 February 1929.

25 Giovanni Battista Montini, "Ai fucini: parole buone dopo i fatti grandi", **Azione Fucini**, 24 February 1929.

26 **Il Lavoro Fascista**, 19 March 1931.

27 **Azione Fucina**, 3 May 1931.

28 C. Delzell, ed. **Mediterranean Fascism 1919-1945: Selected Documents** (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 171.

29 Archivio della Presidenza della FUCI (Rome), busta Pavia. "I. Righetti to V. Borroni," 26 May 1928. Herafter, A.P.F..

30 A.P.F., b. Presidenza, 1919-1931. "Consiglio della Presidenza," 1 November 1930.

31 A.C.S., GUF, busta 24, Padova. "C.Scorza to A. Lusignoli," 13 March 1931.

32 A.P.F., b. Presidenza, 1936-1940.

33 Maria Cristina Giuntella, op. cit., p. 134.

34 A.P.F., b. Vaticano: Commissione Episcopale Enti Ecclessiatico; fascicolo, Autorita Ecclessiastiche; sottofascicolo, Rapporto con l'Autorita Ecclesiastiche, 1932-1933.

35 A.P.F., b. Rapporto con l'Autorita Ecclesiastiche, 1939-1945.

36 A.P.F., b. Autorita Ecclesiastiche, 1931-1933.

37 A.C.S., GUF, b. 7. "Il merito alla situazione politica nel campo studentesco universitario," 10 May 1931.

38 **Azione Fucina**, 31 May 1931.

39 A.C.S., GUF, b. 7 "Incidenti fra GUF e FUCI," 5 June 1931.

40 See, for example, A.C.S., GUF b. 25, Verona. "Disciplina, gennaio 1932".

41 A.P.F., B. Intesa, 1938.

42 **Libro e Moschetto**, 9 May 1943.

43 A.C.S., Min. Int., D.G.P.S., A.G.R., Cat., G-1, busta 19, fascicolo 221. "La prefettura di Padova," 11 November 1942.

44 A.C.S., Min. Int., D.G.P.S., A.G.R., Cat., G-1, busta 19, fascicolo 221. Divisione Polizia Politica, "Relazione Fiduciana sulla FUCI," 18 April 1942.

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